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Allocation Rules for Network Games

Jackson, Matthew O. (2003) Allocation Rules for Network Games. Social Science Working Paper, 1160. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given network structure. I present a family of allocation rules that incorporate information about alternative network structures when allocating value.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Version
Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Additional Information:I thank Jernej Copic, Sergio Currarini, and Gabrielle Demange for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts. Financial support from the Lee Center for Advanced Networking is gratefully acknowledged. Published as Jackson, M.O. (2005). Allocation rules for network games. Games and Economic Behavior, 51(1), 128-154.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Caltech Lee Center for Advanced NetworkingUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:networks, core, Myerson Value, Shapley Value, allocation rules
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1160
Classification Code:JEL: C71, C72, A14
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-162757854
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79723
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 03:56
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:23

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