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Non-Excludable Public Good Experiments

Saijo, Tatsuyoshi and Yamato, Takehiko and Yokotani, Konomu and Cason, Timothy N. (2002) Non-Excludable Public Good Experiments. Social Science Working Paper, 1154. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We conducted a two-stage game experiment with a non-excludable public good. In the first stage, two subjects choose simultaneously whether or not they commit to contributing nothing to provide a pure public good. In the second stage, knowing the other subject's commitment decision, subjects who selected not to commit in the first stage choose contributions to the public good. We found no support for the evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium, and the ratio of subjects who did not commit to contributing nothing increased as rounds advanced; that is, the free-riding rate declined over time. Furthermore, this behavior did not arise due to altruism or kindness among subjects, but from spiteful behavior of subjects.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Version
Cason, Timothy N.0000-0001-9581-5015
Additional Information:Orig May 1997; revised October 2002. We thank Takenori Inoki, Mamoru Kaneko, Hajime Miyazaki, Toru Mori, Mancur Olson, Mitsuo Suzuki, two anonymous referees, and participants at the Fall 1996 Economic Science Association conference for their helpful comments and discussions. This research was partially supported by the Zengin Foundation for the Studies on Economics and Finance, Grant in Aid for Scientific Research 08453001 of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture in Japan, and the Tokyo Center for Economic Research Grant. Published as Cason, T.N., Saijo, T., Yamato, T., & Yokotani, K. (2004). Non-excludable public good experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 49(1), 81-102.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Zengin Foundation for the Studies on Economics and FinanceUNSPECIFIED
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)08453001
Tokyo Center for Economic ResearchUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Laboratory, Fairness, Spite, Social preferences, Voluntary contribution mechanism, Hawk–Dove game
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1154
Classification Code:JEL: D70, C90, H41
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-170555282
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79728
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 03:50
Last Modified:09 Mar 2020 13:18

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