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Separation of Decisions in Group Identification

Miller, Alan D. (2006) Separation of Decisions in Group Identification. Social Science Working Paper, 1249. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We study a model of group identification in which individuals’ opinions as to the membership of a group are aggregated to form a list of the group’s members. Potential aggregation rules are studied through the axiomatic approach. We introduce two axioms, meet separability and join separability, each of which requires the list of members generated by the aggregation rule to be independent of whether the question of membership in a group is separated into questions of membership in two other groups. We use these axioms to characterize a class of “one vote” rules, in which one opinion determines whether an individual is considered to be a member of a group. We then use this characterization to provide new axiomatizations of the liberal rule, in which each individual determines for himself whether he is a member of the group, as the only non-degenerate anonymous rule satisfying the meet separability and join separability axioms.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:Special thanks to Christopher P. Chambers and Dov Samet for their advice and encouragement while writing this paper. Helpful comments were also provided by Ken Binmore, Kim Border, Federico Echenique, Jon X Eguia, Philip T. Hoffman, Matias Iaryczower, R. Preston McAfee, Stuart McDonald, Kateryna Sydorova, Oscar Volij, Eyal Winter, Andriy Zapechelnyuk, and seminar participants at the California Institute of Technology and at the Second Israeli Game Theory Conference in Honor of Professor Yisrael Aumann. All errors are my own.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Group Identification, Liberal Rule, Separability, Voting, Axiom
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1249
Classification Code:JEL: D70, D71, D72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-101737968
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79746
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 17:50
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:23

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