Published November 2005
| Version Submitted
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Non-Existence of Equilibrium in Vickrey, Second-Price, and English Auctions
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Abstract
A simple example shows that equilibria can fail to exist in second price (Vickrey) and English auctions when there are both common and private components to bidders' valuations and private information is held on both dimensions. The example shows that equilibrium only exists in the extremes of pure private and pure common values, and that existence in standard models is not robust to a slight perturbation.
Additional Information
This is a revised version of Jackson (1999), where the implications of the example have been strengthened, and the discussion of its implications for the auctions literature has been updated. I thank Andy Postlewaite for encouraging me to resurrect this paper, Laurent Mathevet for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Jeroen Swinkels for many valuable discussions of the subject.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1241.pdf
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Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 79765
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-114410645
Related works
- Describes
- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171211-131645340 (URL)
Dates
- Created
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2017-08-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1241