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Non-Existence of Equilibrium in Vickrey, Second-Price, and English Auctions

Jackson, Matthew O. (2005) Non-Existence of Equilibrium in Vickrey, Second-Price, and English Auctions. Social Science Working Paper, 1241. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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A simple example shows that equilibria can fail to exist in second price (Vickrey) and English auctions when there are both common and private components to bidders' valuations and private information is held on both dimensions. The example shows that equilibrium only exists in the extremes of pure private and pure common values, and that existence in standard models is not robust to a slight perturbation.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Version
Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Additional Information:This is a revised version of Jackson (1999), where the implications of the example have been strengthened, and the discussion of its implications for the auctions literature has been updated. I thank Andy Postlewaite for encouraging me to resurrect this paper, Laurent Mathevet for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Jeroen Swinkels for many valuable discussions of the subject.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:auctions, English auctions, Vickrey auction, equilibrium, existence
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1241
Classification Code:JEL: D44, C72, D41, G14
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-114410645
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79765
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 20:16
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:23

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