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Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players

Jackson, Matthew O. and Wilkie, Simon (2002) Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players. Social Science Working Paper, 1150. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons games, among others.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Version
Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Additional Information:We thank Ken Hendricks, Philippe Jéhiel, Ehud Kalai, Roger Lagunoff, Bentley MacLeod, Nolan Miller, Hakan Orbay, Mike Peters, and seminar participants at the University of Arizona, Caltech, University of Texas, University of Toronto, U.B.C., USC, and the Decentralization Conference for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support under NSF grants SES-9986190 and SES-9986676 is gratefully acknowledged. Published as Jackson, M.O., & Wilkie, S. (2005). Endogenous games and mechanisms: Side payments among players. The Review of Economic Studies, 72(2), 543-566.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Subject Keywords:games, mechanism design, side payments, coarse theorem, endogenous games, endogenous mechanisms
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1150
Classification Code:JEL: C72, D72, D78, H41, K12
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-133314873
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79771
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 21:05
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:23

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