Published November 2002
| Submitted
Working Paper
Open
Equilibrium Agenda Formation
Chicago
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Abstract
We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined, and in fact coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas. Under voting by successive elimination (or amendment), the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several specific settings and show that studying equilibrium agendas can lead to sharp predictions, in contrast with well-known "chaos" theorems.
Additional Information
Financial support under NSF grant SES-9986190 and an RTDF grant from the University of Warwick are gratefully acknowledged. Published as Dutta, B., Jackson, M.O., & Le Breton, M. (2004). Equilibrium agenda formation. Social Choice and Welfare, 23(1), 21-57.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79772
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-133318577
- NSF
- SES-9986190
- University of Warwick
- Created
-
2017-08-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1152