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Equilibrium Agenda Formation

Dutta, Bhaskar and Jackson, Matthew O. and Le Breton, Michel (2002) Equilibrium Agenda Formation. Social Science Working Paper, 1152. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined, and in fact coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas. Under voting by successive elimination (or amendment), the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several specific settings and show that studying equilibrium agendas can lead to sharp predictions, in contrast with well-known "chaos" theorems.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Version
Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Additional Information:Financial support under NSF grant SES-9986190 and an RTDF grant from the University of Warwick are gratefully acknowledged. Published as Dutta, B., Jackson, M.O., & Le Breton, M. (2004). Equilibrium agenda formation. Social Choice and Welfare, 23(1), 21-57.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
University of WarwickUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:agenda formation, voting, endogenous agendas, equilibrium
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1152
Classification Code:JEL: D71, D72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-133318577
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79772
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 20:50
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:23

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