Jackson, Matthew O. and Nicolò, Antonio (2002) The Strategy-Proof Provision of Public Goods under Congestion and Crowding Preferences. Social Science Working Paper, California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-141721922
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Abstract
We examine the strategy-proof provision of excludable public goods when agents care not only about the level of provision of a public good, but also the number of consumers. We show that on such domains strategy-proof and efficient social choice functions satisfying an outsider independence condition must be rigid in that they must always assign a fixed number of consumers, regardless of individual desires to participate. The fixed number depends on the attitudes of agents regarding group size - being small when congestion effects dominate (individuals prefer to have fewer other consumers) and large when cost sharing effects dominate (agents prefer to have more consumers). A hierarchical rule selects which consumers participate and a variation of a generalized median rule to selects the level of the public good. Under heterogeneity in agents' views on the optimal number of consumers, strategy-proof, efficient, and outsider independent social choice functions are much more limited and in an important case must be dictatorial.
Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) | ||||||
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Additional Information: | Financial support under NSF grant SES-9986190 is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Salvador Barbera and David Cantala for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Published as Jackson, M. O., & Nicolo, A. (2004). The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 115(2), 278-308. | ||||||
Group: | Social Science Working Papers | ||||||
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Subject Keywords: | public goods, congestion, club goods, strategy-proof | ||||||
Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper | ||||||
Classification Code: | JEL: D62, H23 | ||||||
Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-141721922 | ||||||
Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-141721922 | ||||||
Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
ID Code: | 79776 | ||||||
Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||
Deposited On: | 02 Aug 2017 21:32 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:23 |
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