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Core Many-to-one Matchings by Fixed-Point Methods

Echenique, Federico and Oviedo, Jorge (2002) Core Many-to-one Matchings by Fixed-Point Methods. Social Science Working Paper, 1140. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. When preferences are substitutable, our characterization gives a simple proof of the lattice structure of core matchings, and it gives a method for computing the join and meet of two core matchings.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:We are grateful to Alejandro Neme and Ruth Martínez for their helpful comments. Published as Echenique, Federico and Oviedo, Jorge (2004) Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods. Journal of Economic Theory, 115 (2). pp. 358-376.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Matching, Core, Lattice, Stability, Algorithm, Complexity, Substitutability, Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1140
Classification Code:JEL: C78
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-154832632
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79789
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 23:50
Last Modified:26 Nov 2019 11:15

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