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Incomplete Information

Aumann, Robert J. and Heifetz, Aviad (2001) Incomplete Information. Social Science Working Paper, 1124. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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In interactive contexts such as games and economies, it is important to take account not only of what the players believe about substantive matters (such as payoffs), but also of what they believe about the beliefs of other players. Two different but equivalent ways of dealing with this matter, the semantic and the syntactic, are set forth. Canonical and universal semantic systems are then defined and constructed, and the concepts of common knowledge and common priors formulated and characterized. The last two sections discuss relations with Bayesian games of incomplete information and their applications, and with interactive epistemology -- the theory of multi-agent knowledge and belief as formulated in mathematical logic.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Incomplete or Differential Information, Interactive Epistemology, Semantic Belief Systems, Syntactic Belief Systems, Common Priors
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1124
Classification Code:JEL: D82, C70
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170807-134049226
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79852
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:07 Aug 2017 22:18
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:24

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