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A Note on Impossibility Theorems and Seniority Rules

Hild, Matthias (2001) A Note on Impossibility Theorems and Seniority Rules. Social Science Working Paper, 1123. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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The purpose of a social choice rule is to resolve conflicts among the preferences of a group of individuals. We should therefore require a social choice rules not to remain indecisive between alternatives for which individuals have conflicting preferences. Suppose we also adopt the requirements of a universal domain, strict Pareto optimality and independence of irrelevant alternatives. We then obtain the existence of a dictatorship (for binary choices) already under the weak consistency assumption that the group’s choice function must always generate a preference relation that is acyclical over triples of alternatives. By contrast to other theorems, this results holds without any restrictions on the size of the group and without the axiom of positive responsiveness. Under the same consistency condition, we furthermore obtain an axiomatic characterization of seniority rules, also known as lexical dictatorships.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:Published as Hild, M. (2004). A note on impossibility theorems and seniority rules. Theory and decision, 57(1), 69-78.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:consistency, lexical dictatorship, rationality, seniority, social choice theory
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1123
Classification Code:JEL: D63, D71
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170807-134702103
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79853
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:07 Aug 2017 22:16
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:24

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