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Economic Value of EWA Lite: A Functional Theory of Learning in Games

Ho, Teck-Hua and Camerer, Colin F. and Chong, Juin-Kuan (2001) Economic Value of EWA Lite: A Functional Theory of Learning in Games. Social Science Working Paper, 1122. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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EWA Lite is a one-parameter theory of learning in normal-form games. It approximates the free parameters in an earlier model (EWA) with functions of experience. The theory is tested on seven different games and compared to other learning and equilibrium theories. Either EWA Lite or parameterized EWA predict best, but one kind of reinforcement learning predicts well in games with mixed-strategy equilibrium. Belief learning models fit worst. The economic value of theories is measured by how much more subjects would have earned if they followed theory recommendations. EWA Lite and EWA add the most economic value in every game but one.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Ho, Teck-Hua0000-0001-5210-4977
Camerer, Colin F.0000-0003-4049-1871
Chong, Juin-Kuan0000-0002-5187-8652
Additional Information:This paper should not be circulated or quoted without permission. Thanks to participants in the Southern Economics Association meetings (December, 2000), the Wharton School Decision Processes Workshop, and C. Monica Capra for comments.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1122
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170807-135200613
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79855
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:07 Aug 2017 22:15
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:24

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