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A Note On Impossibility Theorems and Seniority Rules

Hild, Matthias (2004) A Note On Impossibility Theorems and Seniority Rules. Theory and Decision, 57 (1). pp. 69-78. ISSN 0040-5833. doi:10.1007/s11238-004-2631-8.

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We characterize seniority rules, also known as lexical dictatorships, under weak consistency constraints on the group’s choice function. These constraints are base triple-acyclicity in the case of binary choices and rationalizability (although not rationality) in the case of choices between an arbitrary number of alternatives. Existing results on these weakened constraints remain silent on the treatment of the group’s most junior individuals and therefore do not yield a complete characterization of seniority rules. We also impose a universal domain, binary strict Pareto optimality, binary Pareto indifference, binary independence of irrelevant alternatives, and the newly introduced condition of conflict resolution. The latter condition requires a social choice rules not to remain indecisive between alternatives for which individuals have conflicting preferences.

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Additional Information:© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Errata:This revised version was published online in May 2005 with a corrected article title.
Subject Keywords:Consistency; Lexical dictatorship; Rationality; Seniority; Social choice theory
Issue or Number:1
Classification Code:JEL: D63, D71
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-085027892
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Official Citation:Hild, M. Theor Decis (2004) 57: 69.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79911
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:08 Aug 2017 16:56
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 17:51

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