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Finite Perfect Information Extensive Games with Generic Payoffs

Hummel, Patrick (2005) Finite Perfect Information Extensive Games with Generic Payoffs. Social Science Working Paper, 1235. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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In finite perfect information extensive (FPIE) games, backward induction (BI) gives rise to all pure-strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) may give different outcomes for different orders of elimination. Duggan recently posed several conjectures in an effort to better understand the relationship between BI and IEWDS in FPIE games. One conjecture states that the unique BI strategy profile in FPIE games with generic payoffs is guaranteed to survive IEWDS when all weakly dominated strategies are eliminated at every round. This paper exhibits a counterexample to this conjecture.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:I thank the Caltech SURF program for funding and Federico Echenique for advice.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Caltech Summer Undergraduate Research Fellowship (SURF)UNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:perfect information games, extensive games, backward induction, weakly dominated strategies, iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, generic payoffs
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1235
Classification Code:JEL: C72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-134943416
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79943
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:09 Aug 2017 18:50
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:25

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