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Citizen Candidates Under Uncertainty

Eguia, Jon X. (2005) Citizen Candidates Under Uncertainty. Social Science Working Paper, 1233. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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In this paper we make two contributions to the growing literature on "citizen-candidate" models of representative democracy. First, we add uncertainty about the total vote count. We show that in a society with a large electorate, where the outcome of the election is uncertain and where winning candidates receive a large reward from holding office, there will be a two-candidate equilibrium and no equilibria with a single candidate. Second, we introduce a new concept of equilibrium, which we term "sincere-strategic," and we show that with this refinement, the two equilibrium candidates will not be too extreme, one will lean to the left and the other one to the right.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Version
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Citizen Candidates, Uncertainty, Strategic Voting, Sincere Voting
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1233
Classification Code:JEL: D72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-142212101
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79951
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:09 Aug 2017 18:43
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:25

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