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A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues

Echenique, Federico and Yenmez, M. Bumin (2005) A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues. Social Science Working Paper, 1226. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents’ preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:We thank Chris Chambers, Gary Lorden, and seminar audiences at the University of Arizona, Brown, UCLA, and Princeton, for comments. We are also grateful to Caltech for a SURF fellowship awarded to Yenmez.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Caltech Summer Undergraduate Research Fellowship (SURF)UNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:matching markets, core, lattice, Gale-Shapley Algorithm
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1226
Classification Code:JEL: C65, C78
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-153108432
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79969
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:09 Aug 2017 18:04
Last Modified:26 Nov 2019 11:15

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