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Voluntary Implementation

Jackson, Matthew O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1999) Voluntary Implementation. Social Science Working Paper, 1077. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-165154639

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Abstract

We examine Nash implementation when individuals cannot be forced to accept the outcome of a mechanism. Two approaches are studied. The first approach is static where a state-contingent participation constraint defines an implicit mapping from rejected outcomes into outcomes that are individually rational. We call this voluntary implementation and show that the constrained Walrasian correspondence is not voluntarily implementable. The second approach is dynamic where a mechanism is replayed if the outcome at any stage is vetoed by one of the agents. We call this stationary implementation and show that if players discount the future in any way, then the constrained Walrasian correspondence is stationarily implementable.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-163541677Related ItemPublished Version
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:Revised version. Original dated to May 1998. We thank an associate editor, an anonymous referee, and Bhaskar Dutta for helpful comments and suggestions. Published as Jackson, M. O., & Palfrey, T. R. (2001). Voluntary implementation. Journal of Economic Theory, 98(1), 1-25.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:implementation, individual rationality, voluntary implementation, stationary implementation
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1077
Classification Code:JEL: D71, D78, C72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-165154639
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-165154639
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79988
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:09 Aug 2017 16:46
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:26

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