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An axiomatic theory of political representation

Chambers, Christopher P. (2005) An axiomatic theory of political representation. Social Science Working Paper, 1218. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-092845210

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Abstract

We discuss the theory of voting rules which are immune to gerrymandering. Our approach is axiomatic. We show that any rule that is unanimous, anonymous, and representative consistent must decide a social alternative as a function of the proportions of agents voting for each alternative, and must either be independent of this proportion, or be in one-to-one correspondence with the proportions. In an extended model in which voters can vote over elements of the unit interval, we introduce and characterize the quasi-proportional rules based on unanimity, anonymity, representative consistency, strict monotonicity, and continuity. We show that we can always (pointwise) approximate a single-member district quota rule with a quasi-proportional rule. We also establish that upon weakening strict monotonicity, the generalized target rules emerge.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Chambers, Christopher P.0000-0001-8253-0328
Additional Information:I would like to thank participants of the 2004 Meeting of the Society of Economic Design, and from the joint Harvard/MIT Economic Theory seminar.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:gerrymandering, representative systems, proportional representation, social choice, quasi-arithmetic means
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1218
Classification Code:JEL: D63, D70
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-092845210
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-092845210
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80002
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:09 Aug 2017 16:35
Last Modified:09 Mar 2020 13:18

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