CaltechAUTHORS
  A Caltech Library Service

Consistent representative democracy

Chambers, Christopher P. (2005) Consistent representative democracy. Social Science Working Paper, 1217. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-093454389

[img] PDF (SSWP 1217 - Mar. 2005) - Submitted Version
See Usage Policy.

329Kb

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-093454389

Abstract

We study axioms which define “representative democracy” in an environment in which agents vote over a finite set of alternatives. We focus on a property that states that whether votes are aggregated directly or indirectly makes no difference. We call this property representative consistency. Representative consistency formalizes the idea that a voting rule should be immune to gerrymandering. We characterize the class of rules satisfying unanimity, anonymity, and representative consistency. We call these rules “partial priority rules.” A partial priority rule can be interpreted as a rule in which each agent can “veto” certain alternatives. We investigate the implications of imposing other axioms to the list specified above. We also study the partial priority rules in the context of specific economic models.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171211-134829793Related ItemPublished Version
Additional Information:I would like to thank John Duggan, Larry Epstein, Biung-Ghi Ju, Roger Lagunoff, Leonardo Martinez, Josef Perktold, Francesco Squintani, William Thomson, and Chun-Hsien Yeh for useful conversations. All errors are my own.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Social choice, representative systems, majority rule, gerrymandering
Classification Code:JEL: D63, D70
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-093454389
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-093454389
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80003
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:09 Aug 2017 16:40
Last Modified:20 Dec 2017 18:21

Repository Staff Only: item control page