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Equilibrium Equivalence with J Candidates and N Voters

Patty, John W. (1999) Equilibrium Equivalence with J Candidates and N Voters. Social Science Working Paper, 1069. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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In this paper, we examine the incentives facing candidates in the spatial voting model. We assume that voters' types are independent, but allow for nonidentical distributions across voters. Examining candidate positional equilibria as a function of voter behavior, we find that what we term p-symmetric strict p-local equilibria when candidates maximize expected plurality are also strict p-local equilibris when candidates maximize probability of victory. This result holds for arbitrary numbers of candidates and voters. We also show that, for generic type distributions, interior p-asymmetric equilibria under maximization of expected vote share are not equilibria under maximization of probability of victory.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:This research would not have been possible without the comments and encouragement of Richard McKelvey. The author thanks Jeff Banks, Fred Boehmke, Serena Guarnaschelli, and Tom Palfrey for advice and helpful discussions. The support of the Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences at the California Institute of Technology is also gratefully acknowledged.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Caltech Division of Humanities and Social SciencesUNSPECIFIED
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1069
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-144525092
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80244
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:10 Aug 2017 21:52
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:28

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