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Collusion in private value ascending price auctions

Sherstyuk, Katerina (1999) Collusion in private value ascending price auctions. Social Science Working Paper, 1063. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We investigate bidder collusion in one-sided ascending price auctions without communication. If bidding rules in an English-type auction allow bidders to match each other’s' bids, collusion can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium of a one-shot auction game. Our earlier experiments show that in common value auctions with complete information, collusion does occur and is sustainable even when bidders cannot explicitly coordinate their strategies. In this study, we investigate the robustness of bidders' collusive behavior in private values, private information environments. We find that collusion still occurs as long as the bidders' gains from collusion are high.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:I would like to thank Dan Levin, Charles Plott, Roger Wilkins and the participants of the March 1999 International Symposium on New Development in Experimental Economics (Osaka, Japan) for helpful discussion and suggestions. Financial support by the Australian Research Council is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are my own. Published as Sherstyuk, K. (2002). Collusion in private value ascending price auctions. Journal of economic behavior & organization, 48(2), 177-195.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Australian Research CouncilUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:auction experiments; tacit collusion
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1063
Classification Code:JEL: C92, D44
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-155523315
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80259
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:10 Aug 2017 23:44
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:29

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