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A New and Improved Design for Multi-Object Iterative Auctions

DeMartini, Christine and Kwasnica, Anthony M. and Ledyard, John O. and Porter, David (1999) A New and Improved Design for Multi-Object Iterative Auctions. Social Science Working Paper, California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-170308555

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Abstract

In this paper we present a new improved design for multi-object auctions and report on the results of tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes, the Milgrom FCC design (see Milgrom (1995)) and the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks et al. (1989)). Then, by adding one crucial new feature, we are able to create a new design, the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) auction process, which performs better than both. We are able to demonstrate, in both simple and complex environments, that the RAD auction achieves higher efficiencies, lower bidder losses, and faster times to completion without increasing the complexity of a bidder's problem.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170814-080712373Related ItemPublished Version
Alternate Title:A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
Additional Information:Published as Kwasnica, A.M., Ledyard, J.O., Porter, D., & DeMartini, C. (2005). A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions. Management science, 51(3), 419-434.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-170308555
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-170308555
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80271
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:11 Aug 2017 19:02
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:29

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