CaltechAUTHORS
  A Caltech Library Service

Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game

Jackson, Matthew O. and Moselle, Boaz (1998) Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game. Social Science Working Paper, 1036. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-152345079

[img] PDF (sswp 1036 - May 1998) - Submitted Version
See Usage Policy.

355Kb

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-152345079

Abstract

We examine a legislative voting game where decisions are being made over both ideological and distributive dimensions, and legislators' preferences are separable over the two dimensions. In equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together, rather than offering sequential proposals on the two dimensions separately. The equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions and in any equilibrium there is a positive probability that a proposal is made and approved which excludes the median legislator (as defined over the ideological dimension), in contrast with a game where no distributive decision is being made. Moreover, in any stationary equilibrium there is more than one ideological decision that has a positive probability of being proposed and approved. We show that legislators can gain from forming political parties, and consider examples where predictions can be made about the composition of parties. We discuss the impact of political parties on the outcome.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-145808416Related ItemPublished Version
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Additional Information:Financial support under NSF grant SBR-9507912 is gratefully acknowledged. We thank David Austen-Smith, Tim Feddersen, Richard McKelvey, and Roger Myerson for helpful comments and discussions, and Steve Callander for calculations on one of the examples. Published as Jackson, M.O., & Moselle, B. (2002). Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game. Journal of Economic Theory, 103(1), 49-87.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSBR-9507912
Subject Keywords:Bargaining, Legislative Voting, Political Parties, Coalition Formation
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1036
Classification Code:JEL: C78, D71, D72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-152345079
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-152345079
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80317
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:11 Aug 2017 23:41
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:29

Repository Staff Only: item control page