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Repeated Implementation

Kalai, Ehud and Ledyard, John O. (1998) Repeated Implementation. Social Science Working Paper, 1027. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA.

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In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation “folk theorem”: for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemLater version published in Journal of Economic Theory
Additional Information:Revised version. Original dated to August 1996. The authors wish to thank Andreas Blume, Tim Feddersen, Alvaro Sandroni, and a referee of JEL for helpful suggestions. Kalai’s research is partly supported by NSF Economics Grant No. SBR-955421. Ledyard’s research is partly supported by the New Millennium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. Published as Kalai, E., & Ledyard, J.O. (1998). Repeated implementation. Journal of Economic Theory, 83(2), 308-317.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
New Millennium Project Office, JPLUNSPECIFIED
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1027
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-163520727
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80328
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:11 Aug 2017 23:44
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:29

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