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The Effect of Bid Withdrawal in a Multi-Object Auction

Porter, David P. (1997) The Effect of Bid Withdrawal in a Multi-Object Auction. Social Science Working Paper, California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170815-154953137

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Abstract

The Federal Communications Commission currently utilizes a simultaneous multi-round ascending bid auction to allocate Personal Communication Services licenses. In the auction, participants are allowed to withdraw standing bids at a penalty. The penalty is equal to the difference between the price at which the bid was withdrawn and the highest bid after the withdrawal. The withdrawal rule was added to the auction design to assist bidders wishing to assemble combinations of licenses who may find themselves stranded with an assortment of licenses for which their bids sum to more than their value. This paper reports results of experiments that examine the effect of the withdrawal rule in environments in which losses can occur if packages of licenses must be assembled piecemeal. The experiments demonstrate that there is a tradeoff with using the rule: efficiency and revenue increase, but individual losses are larger. Furthermore, the increased efficiency does not outweigh the higher prices paid so that bidder surplus falls in the presence of the withdrawal rule.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-134841373Related ItemPublished Version
Additional Information:Published as Porter, D.P. (1999). The effect of bid withdrawal in a multi-object auction. Review of Economic Design, 4(1), 73-97.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170815-154953137
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170815-154953137
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80443
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:16 Aug 2017 16:46
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:31

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