

DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125

EXPLAINING THE GENDER GAP IN U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1980-1992

Carole Chaney
University of California, Riverside

R. Michael Alvarez
California Institute of Technology

Jonathan Nagler
University of California, Riverside



SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 979

August 1996

Explaining the Gender Gap in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1980-1992*

Carole Chaney

R. Michael Alvarez

Jonathan Nagler

Abstract

This paper compares the voting behavior of women and men in presidential elections since 1980 to test competing explanations for the gender gap. We show that, consistent with prior research on individual elections, women placed more emphasis on the national economy than men, and men placed more emphasis on pocketbook voting than women. We add evidence showing that women have consistently more negative assessments of the economy than do men, suggesting that a part of what has been considered a Republican-Democratic gender gap is really an anti-incumbent bias on the part of women. Our multivariate analysis demonstrates that neither the differences between men and women's preferences nor emphasis on any single issue explains the significant gender gap in vote choice; but that a combination of respondent views on the economy, social programs, military action, abortion, and ideology can consistently explain at least three-fourths of the gender gap in the 1984, 1988, and 1992 elections. We also clarify the interpretation of partisan identification in explaining the gender gap.

*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1996 Midwest Political Science Association Meeting; Chicago, Illinois, April, 1996. Comments are welcome. The authors can be reached at: Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125 and Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521, respectively. The authors can be reached more quickly at: cchaney@wizard.ucr.edu; rma@crunch.caltech.edu; nagler@wizard.ucr.edu. Nagler thanks the NSF for grant SBR-9413939.

1 Introduction

In 1992 the Democratic presidential candidate received a greater share of the votes of women than of men. This continued a phenomenon seen in all presidential elections since 1980, in which women have consistently voted at a higher rate for Democratic presidential candidates than men. There have been many efforts by political analysts to understand what causes the gender gap in presidential voting date back to the presidential election of 1980. Initial speculation that the gender gaps of 1980 and 1984 were simply a personal reaction of women against Ronald Reagan were dispelled in 1988 when the gender gap was as much as 20 points in polls during the summer of 1988 — and when George Bush still suffered a gap of 13 points on election day despite a pointedly aggressive bid for women's votes (Mueller 1991).

In August 1996 public opinion polls documented one of the largest gender gaps in presidential preference since the term was first coined in the early 1980s. One poll showed that women preferred Clinton to Dole by 26 points while men preferred Clinton to Dole by only 7 points. This represents a gender gap of 19 points. Explanations for this gap range from Dole's problems with the Christian Coalition over abortion, to women's preference for Hillary Clinton over Elizabeth Dole. In this paper we offer a coherent explanation of why one group of voters would have significantly different electoral preferences over the span of five consecutive presidential elections.

Earliest analyses of the gender gap suggested that the reason that women preferred Carter to Reagan was the result of Reagan's hawkish foreign policy views (Frankovic 1982). Frankovic's analysis showed that women were deeply concerned that Reagan would embroil the country in armed conflict. By controlling for these concerns, Frankovic asserted, the gender gap in 1980 disappeared. Subsequent studies of male and female policy references with regard to issues of the use of military force have shown that women are significantly more likely than men to have an aversion to the use of force (Smith 1984, Shapiro and Mahajan 1986, Wilcox et al., 1993), although the impact that this policy preference has on actual vote choice has not been explored.

Other political analysts and media commentators were quick to argue that the gender gap was the result of Reagan and the Republican Party's repudiation of the Equal Rights Amendment, which was translated into a feminist backlash against the Republicans (Clymer 1980). Several studies asserted that women's growing political awareness and feminist consciousness could account for their preference for the Democratic presidential candidates (Abzug 1984, Smeal 1984). Conover's analysis of data from the 1985 National Election Pilot Study suggested that self-identified feminists accounted for a large part of the gender gap (Conover 1988). However, other analysts firmly rejected the conclusion that it was women's distinctive feminist concerns which explained the gender gap (Klein 1984, Mansbridge 1985, Cook and Wilcox 1991).

Another vein of research has looked at the socioeconomic status of women for clues in the search for a coherent account of the gender gap and their preference for Democratic candidates (Erie and Rein 1988, Piven 1985). These studies suggest that women's

dependence on the welfare state has led them to resist conservative Republican attempts to dismantle or diminish government agencies and programs which tend to employ and provide benefits to women.¹

A related area of inquiry involves examining the differential economic outlook of men and women to determine if that has an impact on vote choice. Research on vote choice (Fiorina 1981; Kiewiet 1983; Markus 1988; Rosenstone 1983; Tufte 1978) has consistently demonstrated that economic perceptions among the electorate play an important role in presidential elections. Research on gender differences in the electorate has suggested that men and women may not only have different perceptions regarding the health of the economy (May and Stephenson 1994), but that they may also weight their concerns about the economy in different ways (Welch and Hibbing, 1992). Women voters tend to base their vote decision more on their perceptions of the state of the national economy while men are more likely to vote on the basis of their perceptions regarding their personal financial situation (Miller 1988, Welch and Hibbing 1992). Women are also more likely to view the economy more pessimistically than men (May and Stephenson 1994). These distinctive perspectives may provide some leverage in understanding how economic issues affect vote choice for men and women differently.

Finally, several studies have suggested that the only gender gap of interest is the gender gap in partisan identification, and that when we control for the partisan identification of men and women, there is no significant gender gap in electoral choice (Kenski 1988, Cook and Wilcox 1995, Wirls 1985). An analysis of party preferences shows that starting in 1968 women were more likely to identify as Democrats than Republicans (Kenski 1988). Wirls examined CBS News/New York Times survey data from the 1982 and 1984 elections and contended that the gender gap was caused by the relatively slower rates of defection from the Democratic Party by women relative to men in the 1980s. This explanation of the gender gap suggested that it was not the change in political behavior of women that accounted for the gender gap, but the greater change in the political behavior of male voters. In a recent analysis of the gender gap in the 1992 election, utilizing data from the Voter Research and Survey exit polls, Cook and Wilcox suggest that gender differences in policy positions help explain the gender gap in partisanship (rather than vote choice). They contend that, "The partisan differences between men and women are sufficient to explain entirely the gender gap in vote choice between Clinton and Bush: there is no gender gap in vote for the two major candidates after controls for party identification" (Cook and Wilcox 1995, p.211).

2 Explaining the Gender Gap

Unfortunately there are a number of questions which remain unanswered despite the important work which has been conducted in earlier studies. First, most of the previous work on the gender gap has examined only individual presidential races. Thus the insights gained from the past literature on the gender gap in presidential politics is subject to the criticism that it may not generalize to other elections. Here we focus on the four

presidential elections which have occurred since the gender gap was first observed in presidential elections (1980, 1984, 1988 and 1992); our objective is to determine if the gender gap is being driven by factors unique to each election or by similar factors across this twelve-year span of presidential politics.

Second, some studies insinuate that the key to explaining the gender gap is partisanship. We contend that partisanship is certainly a factor in explaining the gender gap, but that issues such as perceptions regarding the economy, feminist issues such as abortion, social compassion issues such as government provision of jobs and funding of child care programs, and issues related to the use of military force, will provide the keys to understanding the gender gap, above and beyond the resulting and obvious differences between men and women in terms of partisan identification.

Finally, most of these previous studies focus solely on 'single-issue' explanations for the gender gap. The gender gap in presidential elections cannot be explained simply as the result of a single factor; we show that men and women differ in their preferences across a whole range of important political issues. It is these broad differences in issue preferences between men and women, and the different emphases men and women place on these issues, which when taken together, explain most of the gender gap in presidential elections.

We start with the first possible explanation for the gender gap — whether men and women have systematically distinct political attitudes. We begin by presenting descriptive statistics regarding gender differences in issue positions for men and women for 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992. We find that women have distinct — but not necessarily substantially different — preferences than men on many issues. An important finding we demonstrate is that women consistently have a more pessimistic view of the economy than do men. Then, we turn to the second possible explanation for the gender gap — whether these attitudes are politicized differently for men and women. To examine this explanation we estimate a multivariate model to determine how men and women translate their preferences into voting behavior. Using these vote choice models, we find that women do not politicize most issues very differently than men. However, economic perceptions provide an important exception. Consistent with Welch and Hibbing (1992), women vote based on their view of the national economy (sociotropically); whereas men vote based on their view of their personal finances (pocketbook voting). Combining these two findings — of the nature of women's opinions and how they translate those opinions into voting behavior — we conclude that women have a larger anti-incumbency bias relative to men when economic performance is poor.

Finally, through simulation we are able to estimate the combined impact of different opinions and different politicizations of those opinions; we are able then to determine how much of the gender gap can be accounted for by each of the different explanations. Consistent with previous research, we find some support for each explanation of the gender gap, which leads us to argue that the causes of the gender gap in presidential politics cannot be reduced to a single explanation. We are able to demonstrate that each

explanation cannot in and of itself account for the magnitude of the gender gap. While none of the sets of factors individually can account for the gender gap, we determine that collectively they account for about three-fourths of it in 1992, and virtually all of it in 1984, and 1988. Note the magnitude of these findings: using a properly specified model we are able to explain **all** of the gender gap in 1984 and 1988.

3 Gender and Differences in Political Attitudes

Before 1980, there was little systematic gender-based difference in presidential election voting. But in the 1980 election, men preferred Reagan to Carter by 55.5% to 36.2%, while women preferred Reagan to Carter by 51.6% to 40.0%, according to National Election Studies data.² Throughout this paper we will consistently refer to the gender gap as the difference between the gap between men and women for the Republican candidate, and the gap between men and women for the Democratic candidate. Hence, in 1980, the gender gap, according to the NES data, was 7.7%.³ While the size of the gender gap has varied subsequent to the 1980 election (there was a gender gap of 15.2% in 1984, a 13.0% gap in 1988, and an 11.7% gap in 1992), women have consistently voted for Democratic presidential candidates in greater numbers than have men. It is this problem — explaining the persistence of the gender gap — to which we turn. In this section, we begin with the first explanation by looking for gender-based differences in the multitude of political attitudes thought to influence vote choice.

First, to explore the potential for gender differences in economic evaluations and voting we begin by using two variables designed to measure an individual's economic perceptions: respondents were asked to assess whether the national economy is better, worse, or the same as in the past year; and respondents were asked if their personal economic situation has gotten better, worse, or stayed the same in the past year. Previous research leads us to expect that women will base their vote choice on their perceptions of the national economic situation, while men will base their vote choice on their perceptions of their personal financial situation (Welch and Hibbing 1992). We examine how these economic perceptions shaped the gender gap in presidential elections.

Second, both public opinion polls and academic survey research data have shown consistent differences between men and women with regards to issues such as government spending for AIDS, child care, the elderly and for other social programs (Center for the American Woman 1992). These findings have led some researchers to conclude that women's propensity to support government spending on social programs reflects their tendency to take a more compassionate stance on these issues than men (Piven 1985; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). To explore the impact of these "compassion issues" on the gender gap in vote choice, we have included in our analyses measures of respondents' views on government spending on food, child care, and government responsibility for providing people with a job and a good standard of living.⁴

Third, ever since the Republican Party repudiated its pro-choice stance in their plat-

form of 1980, the abortion rights issue has been a potent force in presidential elections. The 1992 election was no exception, with the incumbent George Bush reiterating his pro-life stance, and with both Bill Clinton and Ross Perot embracing pro-choice positions. If feminist issues can help explain the gender gap we would expect that women would tend to be more pro-choice than men and that they would tend to weight this issue more heavily in their vote decision than men. We include a measure of how supportive respondents are of a women's right to an abortion.

Fourth, the perceived threat of military conflict obviously was not constant over the period of our analysis. In 1980 Ronald Reagan heated up the cold war, which almost disappeared as an issue by the late 1980's with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The cold war and the Soviet issue are measured in 1980, 1984, and 1988 by questions on the level of defense spending and whether we should cooperate with the USSR. By 1992, these questions were not nearly as relevant. If women are more likely than men to have an aversion to the use of military force, George Bush was potentially at risk with female voters due to his prominent role in the execution of the Persian Gulf War. To determine if an aversion to the use of force was more prevalent among women than men and further to determine if it cost Bush support by women voters we utilized respondents' views regarding the acceptability of using military force to solve international problems for 1992.

Finally, partisan identification of individuals acts as an important variable of interest and an important control variable in our model. It is widely known that women are more likely to identify themselves as Democrats and men are more likely to identify themselves as Republicans (Wirks 1988; Cook and Wilcox 1995). If women tend to prefer the Democratic presidential candidate simply on the basis of partisan identification, then we would expect to see a large and significant coefficient for partisan identification and, when controlling for that partisan identification, no significant relationship between the issue variables of interest (i.e., economic, compassion, feminist, and force) and vote choice. On the other hand, if women's preferences for Clinton were a function of both partisan identification and distinctive issue positions, then we can gain a richer understanding of the gender gap by examining both partisan identification and issue preferences.

Can we trace the gender gap to strong and lasting differences in political attitudes between men and women? As we stated earlier, the gender gap could be caused by a different distribution of preferences between women and men, as well as different impacts those preferences have on vote choices. In Table 1 ("Descriptive Statistics by Gender") we examine the distribution of preferences among men and women on some of the key variables determining vote choice for the period 1980 to 1992. Table 1 presents the aggregate distribution of political attitudes, broken down by gender and election year. We also present χ^2 statistics, which provide a convenient way to discern whether the differences we observe in the political attitudes of men and women are statistically significant.

[Table 1 Here]

Table 1 shows that in each year women were more pessimistic than men about both

the national economy and their personal finances. Women were more likely than men to think the national economy had gotten worse in the preceding twelve months, and were barely half as likely as men to think it had gotten better in 1988 and 1992. They were also less likely than men to think their personal financial condition had gotten better in the previous twelve months, and more likely than men to think their personal finances had gotten worse. These differences are statistically significant in seven of eight cases, with the one exception being the national economy in 1980.

Table 1 also shows that in general, women are more liberal than men on government provision of jobs, and the liberal-conservative scale. These differences are statistically significant, with χ^2 statistics showing that the distribution of preferences of men and women are distinct. However, examining preferences on a foreign policy issue (cooperation with the USSR) we see that only one of the three χ^2 statistics are significant. But in general, women have significantly more liberal beliefs about issues than do men.

Additionally, we see that women during this period are more Democratic than are men. The differences are slight in 1980, and even are statistically insignificant in 1984. But they increase by 1988, and become even larger by the 1992 election. It is obvious from Table 1 that the partisan identification gender gap arises by more men professing to have Republican identification than women.

Last, Table 1 does present one surprise. Men and women have roughly similar beliefs about abortion policy. In both 1980 and 1992 the distribution of belief about abortion for men and women is not statistically distinct. In 1984 and 1988 they are slightly distinct, with marginally more women moving to the pro-life end of the spectrum. But women and men report having almost identical distributions of preferences on this hot social issue.

4 Gender and Differences in Voter Decision Making

To examine whether it is these differences in the distribution of women's views or the differential impact of views on voting that explains the gender gap, we turn to a multivariate model that allows us to consider counter-factual distributions of preferences. Our multivariate vote choice model allows us to estimate the impact of each issue on voting for both men and women, thus determining concretely whether men and women translate their issue beliefs into political behavior in different ways. This model also gives us the ability to examine multiple influences on voting, while simultaneously controlling for the effects of other variables.

The dependent variable is trichotomous in two of the elections we analyze (1980 and 1992) and dichotomous in the other two elections (1984 and 1988). We use an estimation technique appropriate for each case. For the two elections with three candidates we specified a generalized extreme value (GEV) model. The GEV model is more appropriate for this situation than multinomial logit, or successive binary logits on candidate pairs.

We discuss the technical aspects of GEV in the appendix.⁵ For 1984 and 1988 we used simple binomial logit.

As explanatory variables, we use the factors described in the previous section. For 1980, 1984, and 1988 we include the respondents' self-reported position on the 7-point ideological scale. For 1992, we include a measure of the ideological distance between the respondent and the candidate. We also include a set of measures of specific issues, examining the respondent's views on whether the government should guarantee jobs to everyone; abortion, defense spending and cooperation with the USSR (1980, 1984, 1988), the use of military force to resolve international conflicts (1992), government spending on food stamps (1984, 1988) and government spending on child-care (1992). To consider the effect of the economy we include the respondent's view of the national economy, as well as their views on their personal finances. We also include the respondent's partisanship, and to be sensitive to the turnout increase in 1992 and allow for possible differences between those voters who had not voted in the previous election, we included a dummy variable measuring whether the voter was a new or 'returning' voter (1992). Finally, we include several demographic measures of each respondent: region, education, and age.

We estimate the model separately for women and men, because a primary focus of our inquiry is to see if women and men weight the various issues differently in considering their vote choice. This allows us to test our primary hypotheses: if women weight issues differently in their vote choices than do men, we expect to see that the estimated coefficients in our GEV and logit models for women are significantly different than those for men. On the other hand, if the driving forces behind the gender gap are the apparent differences in the distributions of preferences for the various issues we examine, we should find the estimated coefficients are similar for both men and women.

The estimates for both men and women are reported in Table 2a for 1980 and 1984, and in Table 2b for 1988 and 1992. It is impossible to estimate identical models for all four elections. As noted previously, two of the elections had three candidates, and two of the elections had two candidates. While we attempted to use GEV for both three candidate elections, because of the small number of Anderson voters in 1980 it was not possible to get reliable estimates - thus we report multinomial logit estimates for 1980. These estimates are equivalent to pairs of binomial logit estimates - we have one set of coefficients for Carter relative to Reagan, and one set of coefficients for Carter relative to Anderson. The first set of coefficients is thus readily comparable to the 1984 and 1988 estimates. Since we estimate the model separately for men and women, there are many coefficients in Table 2. We try to highlight the important results in our discussion; but we primarily treat these estimates as tools for computing the aggregate effects of differences in policy preferences and for noting the overall similarity of the weights women and men give to *most* issues.

[Tables 2a and 2b Go Here]

If men and women politicize these issues differently, we would expect to see variation in which issues are related to vote choice between men and women. Instead, with the

exception of the economic issues, we generally find a tremendous amount of similarity between men and women on what issues contributed to their vote decision between the Democratic and Republican candidates.

First, notice that women and men seem to weight ideology similarly in choosing between candidates. In 1984 and 1988 the coefficients for respondents' ideology differed by less than 10% between men and women; in 1980 the difference was barely 33% (statistically insignificant); and in 1992 the difference in the coefficients for ideology was less than 20% between men and women. For both groups ideology has a significant effect in each election, and has the expected sign. In 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992 the more liberal a respondent was, the more likely they were to vote for the Democratic candidate.

Consistent with previous research (Welch and Hibbing 1992), we find that evaluations of personal finances did not matter for women in all of the four elections, but did matter for men in three of the four elections. In 1980 the coefficient on personal finances for men was negative and significant, and in 1984 and 1992 the coefficient was positive and significant - in all three cases indicating that men who felt their personal finances had gotten worse blamed the incumbent. Also consistent with previous research (Welch and Hibbing 1992), we find that opinions of the state of the national economy matter more for women than men. Women who felt the national economy was worse were less likely to vote for the incumbent in all four elections. Men who felt the national economy had gotten worse were only significantly likely to vote against the incumbent in two elections - 1980 and 1992 - and the estimated coefficient for men in 1992 was barely half the estimated coefficient for women. This difference in behavior relative to economic perceptions is thus remarkably stable over the time period.

We find much less stable results for the compassion issues. We measured compassion with support for the government assuming responsibility for ensuring jobs for people in 1980; and added support for food-stamps in 1984 and 1988. In 1992 we utilized a question on child-care. On the jobs question (our only truly consistent measure over time) we did not have consistent results: women appeared to weight this issue more heavily than men in 1980 and 1988; but in 1984 the estimated coefficient for men was almost twice as large as the coefficient for women; and in 1992 the coefficients were almost identical. The food-stamps coefficients were similar in size in both 1984 and 1988: women appeared to weight the issue more than men in 1984; but men appeared to weight the issue more than women in 1988. In neither year were the differences between the coefficients statistically significant. Finally, we estimated a *larger* coefficient for men than women on the issue of child-care in 1992 for support for Clinton relative to Bush: both men and women who wanted to increase spending on child-care (*ceteris paribus*) were significantly more likely to vote for Clinton. However, whereas men who favored increased child-care spending did not distinguish between Bush and Perot, women who favored child-care spending were more favorable to Bush than Perot. This may give some insight into the problems that Perot had with women voters, in the sense that his primary campaign emphasis on deficit reduction threatened spending on social programs that women, in general, wished to see funded.

On the single feminist issue which we examined, abortion, we again got results that were inconsistent (and surprising) over time. We did not estimate a significant impact of abortion for either men or women in 1980; whereas in 1984 and 1988 we estimated a significant impact for abortion *for men*, but not for women. Finally, in 1992 we estimated a large and significant effect for both men and women in choosing between Clinton and Bush - with a larger effect for women. The estimated coefficients for abortion for both men and women suggest that the issue hurt Bush heavily among pro-choice voters.

Defense spending had a larger estimated impact for women than men in 1980 and 1984; but a larger estimated impact for men than women in 1988. Women were also more affected by their view of cooperation with the USSR than were men in 1980, but in 1984 we estimated a larger effect for men and estimated insignificant effects for both in 1988. With regards to the issue of use of force, we were surprised to find that, contrary to expectations, men were less likely to support Bush in 1992 than were women based on their opposition to the use of force. The coefficient for men is twice as large as the coefficient for women, and statistically significant. This variable had no statistically significant impact for women. It does not appear then that women punished Bush for his role in the Gulf War, a finding that contradicts Frankovic's suggestion that women's fear of war was responsible for their voting against the Republican candidate (Reagan) in the 1980s.

Finally, the grouping of the choices is different for men than for women in 1992. For women, we find that the appropriate model has Bush and Perot grouped, since the estimated value of σ was .61 for women. The standard error of .19 suggests we can be 95% sure that the true value of σ is within the unit interval, and hence that women viewed Clinton as distinct from Bush and Perot in some way beyond the independent variables included in the systemic part of the model. The most likely grouping for men is with Bush and Clinton grouped and Perot viewed as distinctive. But the estimate of σ is not significantly different from 0 at traditional levels.⁶

5 Political Attitudes, Decision Making and the Gender Gap

Tables 1 and 2 have demonstrated areas where men and women differ both in their views on the issues and in the impact of issues on their vote choice. From our multivariate analyses it appears that men and women do not systematically "politicize" their issue positions in a markedly different manner on issues other than the economy; thus we cannot account for the gender gap in vote choice as a function of differential weighting of issues. This approach does not answer the question of what accounts for the gender gap. So, as we stated earlier, the next step is to determine whether there would still be a significant gender gap if women had identical preferences to men on the issues. To answer this we need to generate meaningful predictions of how women would have voted if they had shared men's preferences.

To do this we compared the distribution of women's preferences to men's preferences on the economy, child care (1992), government provision of jobs, abortion, cooperation with the USSR (1980, 1984, 1988), use of force (1992), ideology, and party identification in each election. For each election we then altered the preferences of randomly selected women so that the distribution of preferences among our 'new' set of women matches the distribution of preferences among men. We then computed the probability of voting for each of the candidates for these hypothetical women. Results are reported for each election in Tables 3a thru 3d. We start with the reported vote of men in the NES sample. However, since we can only report estimated vote shares for the sample of women (and men) who respond to the questions used in our multivariate analyses, we included the second row as a reference: the predicted vote share based on the men used in our multivariate analyses. Thus we will compare women who respond to the set of questions asked in our analyses to men who responded to the questions asked in our analyses.⁷ The next row of Table 3a gives the reported preferences for women based on the entire sample. Finally, the fourth row gives the predicted vote-shares for women based on the 'logit sample'. Each other row in the table is compared to this row (and to the estimated vote shares for the logit sample for men). The fourth row also gives the baseline gender gap: the difference between Reagan's lead over Carter among men and Reagan's lead over Carter among women. In 1980 we begin with a baseline gender gap of 13.8% (the difference between the Reagan-Carter gap for women and the Reagan-Carter gap for men).

[Tables 3a thru 3d Here]

When we altered women's views on the economy (both personal finances and the national economy) to match men's more positive evaluations, we predicted vote shares for Reagan and Carter of 52.7% and 37.4%, respectively. Assuming men's more positive economic evaluations, women were more favorable towards the incumbent (Carter). Thus the Reagan-Carter gap (fourth column) is 15.3%, and the gender gap is **increased** to 14.8%. This leads to the realization that much of the observed 1980s gender gap was really an anti-incumbent bias by women. Notice that in *every* year women had less favorable views of the national economy and their personal finances than did men. Since the less favorable a respondents' view of the economy, the less likely they are to vote for an incumbent, women are more likely than men to oppose the incumbent. Since in three of our elections the incumbent was a Republican, this is observationally equivalent to an anti-Republican bias.

In the next several rows of Table 3a one can see that altering womens' views on any particular issue does not lead to a large change in the gender gap. For instance, if women assumed mens' more conservative views on whether the government should help guarantee jobs for everyone the gender gap would only shrink by 0.2% to 13.6%.

When we alter women's preferences simultaneously on all of the issues outlined above (but not their party identification), and reestimate their predicted probability of voting for each of the three candidates, we predict that women will still prefer Reagan to Carter by 17.6% (a gender gap of 12.5%). When we alter respondents positions on all issues

including party identification, then the gender gap shrinks to 6.7%. Thus if one were to only look at 1980, it would appear that party-identification, rather than issue positions, explains much of the gender-gap. However, although our model explains very little of the gender gap in 1980 without party-identification; we are able to explain much more of the gender gap in the other three

elections we analyze utilizing only issue-positions and economic evaluations.

In 1984 we begin with a 6.8% gender gap. After altering women's preferences and economic views on all but party identification to match men's preferences, we end with women 2% more likely than men to prefer Reagan. In 1988 the gap starts at 8.2%, and after again altering women's preferences and economic views on all but party identification, women are .6% more likely than men to prefer Bush. In 1992 the gap goes from 11.3% to 3.0% after altering women's preferences and economic views to match men's preferences and economic views on all but party identification. Thus altering women's preferences on issues and their views on the economy, but not changing their party identification, accounts for 73% of the gap in 1992, and 100% of the gap in 1984 and 1988!

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we have presented data from presidential elections since 1980 which provide strong evidence that there is no simple explanation for the gender gap. Multiple differences in the political preferences of men and women are at the root of the gender gap. These differences include the relatively less secure economic position (or the perception of economic insecurity) among women in American society, and their relatively stronger support for the role of government in providing a "safety net". We conclude that the gender gap in vote choice since 1980 has been a function of distinctive male versus female issue preferences, and not differential "politicization" of these issues. With the exception of economic issues, which are politicized differently by men and women, both men and women were equally likely to vote for Democratic and Republican candidates on the basis of their positions on compassion issues, feminist issues, and use of force issues. The deciding factor in the gender gap is the different positions that men and women take on these issues. Additionally, it appears that the causes of the gender gap are relatively constant from one election to the next, supporting the conclusion of various scholars that women, as a group, are a distinctive voting bloc with regard to these issues (Klein 1984, Abzug 1984, Smeal 1984). Naturally, the converse is true as well — men, as a group, constitute a distinctive voting bloc.

We also conclude that merely explaining the gender gap as a function of differential partisan identification is an under-specification of a correct model of vote choice. When we control for partisan identification the foregoing issues are all still significantly predictive of vote choice for both men and women. The counter-factual scenarios that we simulate, where women have identical preferences to men on compassion issues, feminist issues, and use of force issues, explain almost 75% of the gender gap in each election

since 1980, **without** altering the true distribution of partisan identification of women. The different issue positions and economic concerns of men and women suggest that the shift of men from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party in the past 16 years is a symptom rather than a cause of the gender gap.

The evidence on economic voting provides a resounding confirmation of previous research which has suggested that men are more likely to “vote their pocketbooks” while women are more likely to base their vote choice on how they perceive the economy in general to be performing. This suggests to us that economic perceptions, among women, are yet another example of a compassion issue. Women vote based on how they see the economy affecting others and punish incumbents on this basis rather than on the basis of how their personal financial situation has been affected.

Finally, by examining the distribution of economic views as well as the impact of economic views over several elections, we have shown that a part of the observed Democratic-Republican gender gap is really an incumbent-challenger gender gap. Women are more pessimistic about the state of the national economy than men, and women are more likely than men to vote against the incumbent on the basis of their beliefs about the state of the national economy. Hence it is likely that a Democratic president facing re-election when the national economy is perceived to be performing poorly will find that the support of a core Democratic constituency – women – fades fastest of all.

Interestingly, on the politically volatile issue of abortion, commonly mentioned in the media as a prime suspect driving the gender gap, we find no significant differences between the preferences of men and women, nor do we find significant differences between men and women as to how one’s abortion position relates to vote choice. Both men and women who are pro-choice vote Democratic, and men and women who are pro-life vote Republican. Thus while women are more motivated to participate in political activity than men are by the abortion issue (Schlozman, et al. 1995), their vote choice does not seem to be affected differently.

As long as men and women differ in their beliefs on issues, it is likely that the gender gap will continue as an important component of presidential election politics. However, it is a component that may be amenable to attempts by any candidate to ameliorate by careful attention to the preference distribution in the electorate. Alternatively, the gender gap may become larger as the two parties explicitly choose policy positions to appeal to the different groups of voters: thus magnifying the difference in political behavior between men and women.

7 Appendix: The GEV Model

Since the dependent variable is trichotomous, we use an estimation technique appropriate for such a case: the generalized extreme value (GEV) model. The GEV model is a full-information maximum likelihood estimator which is similar to nested logit. The advantage of GEV over nested logit is that it does *not* impose the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property on the decision maker, since it allows for correlations among disturbances of two of the choices. The IIA property holds when the relative probabilities of a voter choosing between two candidates is unchanged by the availability of other candidates. In other words, IIA states that the relative probabilities of a voter choosing Bush and Clinton would be unaffected by the entrance of Ross Perot into the race. This is a strong assumption. If a voter were to decide based on retrospective considerations, and vote for or against the incumbent based on economic performance, then IIA would likely not hold as Perot would hurt the challenger more than the incumbent. If a voter were to decide based on a candidate's support for non-traditional roles for women, and we did not have a measure of the candidate's support for this, then Perot would probably take votes from Bush as Perot and Bush were similar on this issue and Clinton was different.

The generalized extreme value model depends upon specifying a utility function for each individual where the utility of each alternative consists of a systemic and a stochastic component. It is the stochastic component that differs across the two models. Here we assume that the utility of the i^{th} individual for the j^{th} choice is given as follows:

$$U_{ij} = X_{ij}\beta + a_i\psi_j + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

where a_i is a vector of characteristics unique to the individual i , X_{ij} is a vector of characteristics unique to alternative j relative to individual i ($j = 1,2,3$), ψ_j and β are vectors of parameters to be estimated, and ϵ is a disturbance term. The generalized extreme value model is derived by assuming that the disturbances have an extreme value distribution, which is given by:

$$F(\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \epsilon_3) = \exp[-G(e^{-\epsilon_1}, e^{-\epsilon_2}, e^{-\epsilon_3})] \quad (2)$$

where G is a nonnegative function with the constraints that it be homogeneous of degree 1 and always greater than or equal to 0.

Following Maddala (1983) we simplify the notation by letting $Y_{ij} = e^{V_{ij}}$, where V_{ij} denotes the systemic component of utility (i.e., $V_{ij} = a_i\psi_j + X_{ij}\beta$). For cases with three alternatives where the operative hypothesis is that alternatives 2 and 3 are grouped, G can be defined as follows:

$$G(Y_1, Y_2, Y_3) = Y_1 + (Y_2^{1/(1-\sigma)} + Y_3^{1/(1-\sigma)})^{(1-\sigma)} \quad (3)$$

σ is a parameter to be estimated, and is commonly interpreted as a measure of the correlation between the stochastic elements of alternatives 2 and 3. Furthermore, σ is bounded such that $0 \leq \sigma < 1$. Thus an estimated value of $\hat{\sigma}$ outside these bounds

suggests that the model is misspecified: either the systemic component or the grouping could be misspecified, or both. This leads to the hope that an estimated σ within the range $(0, 1)$ suggests a correct model specification.

Probabilities for the generalized extreme value model are given by:

$$P_{i1} = \frac{Y_{i1}}{G(Y_{i1}, Y_{i2}, Y_{i3})} \quad (4)$$

$$P_{i2} = \frac{Y_{i2}^{1/(1-\sigma)}(Y_{i2}^{1/(1-\sigma)} + Y_{i3}^{1/(1-\sigma)})^{-\sigma}}{G(Y_{i1}, Y_{i2}, Y_{i3})} \quad (5)$$

$$P_{i2} = \frac{Y_{i2}^{1/(1-\sigma)}(Y_{i2}^{1/(1-\sigma)} + Y_{i3}^{1/(1-\sigma)})^{-\sigma}}{G(Y_{i1}, Y_{i2}, Y_{i3})} \quad (6)$$

$$P_{i3} = \frac{Y_{i3}^{1/(1-\sigma)}(Y_{i2}^{1/(1-\sigma)} + Y_{i3}^{1/(1-\sigma)})^{-\sigma}}{G(Y_{i1}, Y_{i2}, Y_{i3})} \quad (7)$$

$$P_{i3} = \frac{Y_{i3}^{1/(1-\sigma)}(Y_{i2}^{1/(1-\sigma)} + Y_{i3}^{1/(1-\sigma)})^{-\sigma}}{G(Y_{i1}, Y_{i2}, Y_{i3})} \quad (8)$$

The log-likelihood function is:

$$LL = \Sigma(y_1 \ln(P_{i1}) + y_2 \ln(P_{i2}) + y_3 \ln(P_{i3})) \quad (9)$$

This is straightforward to evaluate with:

$$\ln(P_1) = V_1 - \ln(G) \quad (10)$$

$$\ln(P_2) = \left(\frac{1}{1-\sigma}\right) V_2 - \sigma \ln(e^{V_2^{1-\sigma}} + e^{V_3^{1-\sigma}}) - \ln(G) \quad (11)$$

$$\ln(P_3) = \left(\frac{1}{1-\sigma}\right) V_3 - \sigma \ln(e^{V_2^{1-\sigma}} + e^{V_3^{1-\sigma}}) - \ln(G) \quad (12)$$

The methodology of the GEV model in this application is simple. We begin by assuming that one pair of the candidates in the 1992 election were seen as relatively similar (say Clinton and Perot as non-incumbents). We then estimate a GEV model with this structure for both men and women. If we obtain an estimate for σ in either model which is statistically within the unit interval, we then have reason to believe this is the appropriate model for the choice process. This means, however, that we estimate three GEV models for both men and women: we investigate three possible grouping structures for the candidates: (Bush, Clinton) versus (Perot); (Bush, Perot) versus (Clinton); and (Clinton, Perot) versus (Bush).

We must stress, though, that despite the computational complexities, the GEV model is more appropriate for this situation than multinomial logit, or successive binary logits on candidate pairs. Both these alternative models impose the IIA property on voters. In fact, the IIA property can be quite problematic in multi-candidate contests, leading to incorrect inferences about how individuals reach their decisions (Alvarez and Nagler 1996a, 1996b).

8 Endnotes

1 This hypothesis may be particularly amenable to examination following the 1996 elections; where the effects of the fervor with which the Republican-controlled House and Senate attempted to implement their Contract with America, which called for tax and spending cuts and reduced government services may be observed.

2 Throughout this paper we use NES numbers for the gender gap. According to exit poll data (CBS/NY Times for 1980, 1984, and 1988; Voter Research Survey for 1992); there were gender gaps of 17%, 13%, 15%, and 6% in the 1980 through 1992 elections, respectively. While the size of the gap varies by poll source; all polls reveal a significant gap for the post 1980 period.

3 The calculation is: (Men's vote for Republican candidate - Men's vote for Democratic candidate) - (Women's vote for Republican candidate - Women's vote for Democratic candidate) = Gender Gap. In the 1980 election, this was $(55.5 - 36.2) - (51.6 - 40.0) = 7.7$. This calculation of the gender gap allows us to take into account third party affects on the split in the vote, which is important to do in the 1980 and 1992 elections.

4 Not all measures were available for all years of the analysis. For 1980 only government jobs was available. For 1984 and 1988 we only had food and government jobs. And for 1992 only child-care and government jobs were available.

5 Unfortunately the small number of Anderson voters in the 1980 sample made it difficult to get reliable GEV estimates; thus we report MNL estimates for 1980.

6 We estimated σ 's for the other two groupings of .52 (.38) and -1.6 (.90) (for Perot and Clinton grouped, and for Bush and Perot grouped). We rejected the Perot and Clinton grouping since we obtained inefficient estimates from that model, despite the estimate of σ which is in the unit interval.

7 In 1980 and 1988 both 'logit samples' for men and women had a pro-Republican bias; in 1984 only the women logit-sample had a pro-Republican bias.

9 References

- Abzug, Bella and Mim Kelber. 1984. *Gender Gap*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Alvarez, R. Michael and Jonathan Nagler. 1996a. "Correlated Disturbances in Discrete Choice Models: A Comparison of Multinomial Probit Models and Logit Models." *Political Analysis*, forthcoming.
- Alvarez, R. Michael and Jonathan Nagler. 1996b. "When Politics and Models Collide: Estimating Models of Multicandidate Elections." *American Journal of Political Science*, forthcoming.
- Clymer, Adam. 1980. "Displeasure with Carter turned many to Reagan." in *New York Times*, November 9. New York.
- Conover, Pamela Johnston. 1988. "Feminists and the Gender Gap." *Journal of Politics* 50: 985-1010.
- Cook, Elizabeth Adell and Clyde Wilcox. 1991. "Feminism and the Gender Gap—A Second Look." *Journal of Politics* 53: 1111-1122.
- Cook, Elizabeth Adell and Clyde Wilcox. 1995. "Women Voters in the 'Year of the Woman'." Pp. 195-219 in *Democracy's Feast: Elections in America*, edited by Herbert F. Weisberg. Chatham: Chathan House Publishers.
- Erie, Steven P. and Martin Rein. 1988. "Women and the Welfare State." p. 173-191 in *The Politics of the Gender Gap: The Social Construction of Political Influence*, edited by Carol M. Mueller. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Frankovic, Kathleen A. 1982. "Sex and Politics— New Alignments, Old Issues." *PS* 15: 439-448.
- Kenski, Henry C. 1988. "The Gender Factor in a Changing Electorate." Pp. 38-60 in *The Politics of the Gender Gap: The Social Construction of Political Influence*, edited by Carol Mueller. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Kiewiet, D. Roderick. 1983. *Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Klein, Ethel. 1984. *Gender Politics: From Consciousness to Mass Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Mansbridge, Jane. 1985. "Myth and Reality: The ERA and the Gender Gap in the 1980 Election." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49: 164-178.

- Markus, Gregory B. 1988. "The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 32: 137-54.
- May, Ann Mari and Kurt Stephenson. 1994. "Women and the Great Retrenchment: The Political Economy of Gender in the 1980s." *Journal of Economic Issues* 28: 533-542.
- Miller, Arthur. 1988. "Gender and the Vote: 1984." Pp. 258-282 in *The Politics of the Gender Gap: The Social Construction of Political Influence*, edited by Carol M. Mueller. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Mueller, Carol. 1991. "The Gender Gap and Women's Political Influence." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 515: 23-37.
- Piven, Frances F. 1985. "Women and the state: Ideology, power and the welfare state." Pp. 265-287 in *Gender and the Life Course*, edited by Alice S. Rossi. New York: Aldine.
- Rosenstone, Steven J. 1983. *Forecasting Presidential Elections*. New Have, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Sapiro, Virginia. 1983. *The Political Integration of Women: Roles, Socialization, and Politics*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Nancy Burns, Sidney Verba, Jesse Donahue. 1995. "Gender and Citizen Participation: Is There a Different Voice?" *American Journal of Political Science* 39: 267-93.
- Shapiro, Robert Y. and Harpreet Mahajan. 1986. "Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50: 42-61.
- Smeal, Eleanor. 1984. *Why and How Women Will Elect the Next President*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Smith, Tom W. 1984. "The Polls: Gender and Attitudes toward Violence." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 48: 384-96.
- Tufte, Edward R. 1978. *Political Control of the Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Welch, Susan and John Hibbing. 1992. "Financial Conditions, Gender and Voting in American National Elections." *Journal of Politics* 54: 197-213.
- Wilcox, Clyde and Joseph Ferrara and Dee Allsop. 1993. "Group Differences in Early Support for Military Action in the Gulf: The Effects of Gender, Generation and Ethnicity." *American Politics Quarterly* 21: 343-359.
- Wirls, Daniel. 1986. "Reinterpreting the Gender Gap." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50: 316-330.

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics by Gender

	1980		1984		1988		1992	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
National Economy ^a								
<i>Better</i>	4.4	3.2	51.3	35.9	25.9	13.4	6.1	3.3
<i>Same</i>	13.7	12.4	29.0	37.1	49.2	50.6	26.3	20.2
<i>Worse</i>	81.9	84.4	19.7	27.0	24.9	36.0	67.6	76.5
$\chi^2(2)$		2.21		51.76*		59.72*		26.72*
Personal Financial Condition ^a								
<i>Better</i>	36.6	29.2	45.9	41.3	47.5	38.7	33.9	27.1
<i>Same</i>	23.8	26.6	30.1	27.4	30.6	34.4	34.5	35.4
<i>Worse</i>	39.5	44.2	24.1	31.2	21.9	26.9	31.5	37.5
$\chi^2(2)$		9.92*		13.97*		16.23*		16.19*
Govt Responsibility for Jobs ^{b,c}	4.45	4.24	4.31	3.98	4.59	4.27	4.53	4.10
$\chi^2(6)$		13.04*		25.09*		17.05*		36.78*
Abortion ^a								
<i>Pro-Life</i>	10.8	12.0	12.0	14.3	10.3	14.4	9.5	11.7
<i>Only Rape</i>	31.7	33.4	28.4	31.7	33.3	33.0	28.4	28.1
<i>When Necessary</i>	21.5	17.1	21.6	18.8	20.1	17.4	15.4	13.2
<i>Pro-Choice</i>	36.0	37.4	38.0	35.2	36.3	35.1	46.9	47.0
$\chi^2(3)$		5.00		7.27**		8.74*		5.17
Cooperate with USSR ^{b,c}	3.95	3.88	4.20	4.02	3.72	3.83	—	—
$\chi^2(6)$		8.06		11.50**		10.50		—
Ideology ^{b,c}	4.33	4.29	4.31	4.16	4.39	4.35	4.29	4.12
$\chi^2(6)$		14.98*		20.26*		13.73*		15.13*
Party Identification ^a								
<i>Democrat</i>	49.8	56.1	46.2	50.7	43.2	51.1	45.1	54.8
<i>Independent</i>	15.3	11.6	11.7	10.7	11.2	10.4	12.5	11.1
<i>Republican</i>	34.9	32.3	42.1	38.6	45.6	38.5	42.4	34.1
$\chi^2(2)$		7.79*		4.34		12.53*		23.40*

^a Cell entries are percentages of respondents placing themselves in the indicated category.

^b Cell entries are mean responses on a 7-point scale.

^c Chi-Squared statistics are presented for comparison of frequencies (which are omitted since we report the means).

Table 2a : 1980-1984
MNL Estimates For 1980 and 1984

Independent Variables	1980				1984	
	Women Carter/ Reagan	Men Carter/ Reagan	Women Carter/ Anderson	Men Carter/ Anderson	Women Dukakis	Men Dukakis
Constant	8.33* (2.34)	1.77 (1.65)	4.74 (3.04)	-3.68 (2.25)	3.00* (1.49)	2.55 (1.94)
Felt national economy was worse	-.64* (.27)	-.14 (.17)	-.34 (.36)	-.50* (.20)	.40* (.13)	.45* (.13)
Felt personal finances were worse	.10 (.13)	-.25* (.11)	.12 (.16)	-.03 (.14)	-.11 (.22)	.98* (.29)
Ideology	-.43* (.21)	-.27** (.15)	-.33 (.27)	-.65* (.22)	-.34* (.15)	-.37* (.17)
Oppose government jobs	-.28** (.15)	-.18 (.12)	-.18 (.20)	-.13 (.18)	-.15 (.13)	-.31* (.15)
Oppose Food Stamps	-	-	-	-	-.83* (.27)	-.58** (.30)
Pro-Choice on Abortion	.27 (.24)	.03 (.18)	.77* (.34)	.73* (.28)	.17 (.18)	.40* (.21)
Oppose Cooperate with USSR	-.20 (.13)	-.07 (.11)	-.08 (.17)	.35* (.15)	-.29* (.11)	-.38* (.13)
Increase Defense Spending	-.33** (.17)	-.16 (.14)	-.63* (.21)	-.07 (.20)	-.25** (.14)	-.18 (.15)
Democratic identifier	2.60* (.84)	2.85* (.74)	1.34 (.95)	1.30 (.94)	2.39* (.61)	1.41* (.57)
Republican identifier	-.84 (.91)	-.54 (.80)	-.90 (1.02)	.77 (.86)	-.87 (.68)	-2.50* (.71)
East	-.67 (.60)	-.17 (.64)	-.66 (.77)	.88 (.61)	-.38 (.49)	.62 (.61)
South	1.03** (.57)	-.24 (.47)	-.87 (.75)	-2.05* (.78)	.17 (.44)	-.35 (.51)
West	-.95 (.68)	.02 (.57)	-.67 (.82)	-.71 (.74)	.48 (.49)	.02 (.54)
Education	-.34* (.16)	.03 (.14)	-.48* (.23)	.40 (.25)	.03 (.15)	-.32* (.16)
Age: 18-29	-1.03 (.68)	1.20* (.60)	.56 (1.04)	1.58** (.94)	-.55 (.56)	1.86* (.73)
Age: 30-44	-.33 (.60)	.03 (.54)	1.24 (.96)	.25 (.94)	-.05 (.51)	.96 (.60)
Age: 45-59	-.58 (.62)	.08 (.58)	-.23 (1.08)	.85 (.95)	-.57 (.58)	.22 (.61)
Number of Observations	Men = 275		Women = 252		449	446
Log Likelihood	Men = -153.71		Women = -137.88		-132.05	-106.79

Table 2b : 1988 and 1992
Binary Logit Estimates for 1988; GEV Estimates for 1992

Independent Variables	1988		1992			
	Women	Men	Women Carter/ Bush	Men Carter/ Bush	Women Perot/ Bush	Men Perot/ Bush
Constant	1.81 (1.63)	4.07* (1.75)	-2.89* (1.10)	-2.00* (.96)	-1.37* (.87)	-2.39* (0.99)
Felt national economy was worse	.45* (.14)	.07 (.15)	.41* (.14)	.24* (.11)	.14 (.09)	.11 (.10)
Felt personal finances were worse	.09 (.24)	.09 (.27)	-.06 (.08)	.24* (.10)	-.04 (.05)	.19* (.08)
Ideology ^a	-.42* (.17)	-.38* (.18)	-.11* (.03)	-.09* (.04)	-.11* (.03)	-.09* (.04)
Oppose government jobs	-.32* (.12)	-.13 (.13)	-.17* (.08)	-.18* (.09)	-.06 (.06)	-.06 (.09)
Oppose Food Stamps	-.91* (.29)	-1.02* (.34)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
Pro-Choice on Abortion	.17 (.18)	.45* (.23)	.41* (.13)	.29* (.13)	.23** (.13)	.33 (.35)
Oppose Cooperate with USSR	.08 (.12)	-.07 (.13)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
Increase Defense Spending	-.11 (.12)	-.33* (.16)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
Democratic identifier	2.35* (.61)	3.48* (.75)	1.92* (.39)	1.74* (.54)	-.11 (.24)	.64 (.53)
Republican identifier	-.130 (.61)	-1.18** (.71)	-1.45* (.42)	-1.68* (.74)	-.58** (.35)	-1.32* (.48)
East	-1.49* (.57)	-.32 (.59)	.65* (.22)	.46 (.35)	-.16 (.18)	.47** (.29)
South	.04 (.50)	-.98** (.60)	.55* (.19)	-.02 (.25)	-.22 (.19)	-.14 (.24)
West	-.37 (.49)	-.90 (.65)	.29 (.20)	.40 (.30)	-.02 (.15)	.52** (.31)
Education	.21 (.14)	-.05 (.14)	-.14 (.09)	.03 (.08)	.06 (.06)	-.18* (.08)
Age: 18-29	-.13 (.62)	-.00 (.71)	-.14 (.22)	.20 (.37)	.25 (.26)	1.58* (.35)
Age: 30-44	-.15 (.50)	-.35 (.61)	.01 (.26)	-.29 (.31)	.29 (.23)	.87* (.30)
Age: 45-59	.56 (.51)	-.66 (.63)	.39 (.32)	.05 (.30)	.02 (.21)	.92* (.32)
Did Not Vote-1988	- (-)	- (-)	-.62* (.31)	-.04 (.27)	-.11 (.19)	-.44 (.23)
Oppose use of force	- (-)	- (-)	.28 (.18)	.49* (.19)	.14 (.10)	.35* (.16)
Oppose Govt Child-Care	- (-)	- (-)	-.11 (.21)	-.36** (.20)	.20 (.14)	-.01 (.19)
Number of Observations	363	380	Men = 545		Women = 539	
Log Likelihood	-110.03	88.73	Men = -350.04		Women = -323.77	

^a Ideology represents respondents' position on the liberal-conservative dimension in 1980, 1984, and 1988; and the distance from the respondent to the candidate in 1992.

Table 3a - 1980
Simulation: Women with Men's Preferences

Variable	Reagan	Carter	Anderson	(Reagan - Carter)	Gender Gap
Men - Predicted (NES sample)	55.5	36.2	8.4		
Men - Predicted (logit sample)	59.6	29.5	10.9	30.1	
Predicted - Real Prefs (NES sample)	51.6	40.0	8.5		
Predicted - Real Prefs (logit sample)	53.2	36.9	9.9	16.5	13.8
Economy ^a	52.7	37.4	9.9	15.3	14.8
Govt.Jobs ^b	53.8	36.3	9.9	17.5	13.6
Abortion	53.2	37.0	9.9	16.2	13.9
Coop with USSR	53.2	36.9	9.9	16.3	13.8
Party ID	55.6	34.4	10.0	21.2	8.9
Ideology ^d	53.6	36.6	9.8	17.0	13.1
All of Above ^e	56.8	33.4	9.8	23.4	6.7
All of Above ^f (except Party-ID)	53.9	36.3	9.8	17.6	12.5

Values are predicted vote-shares of women for each candidate.

^a Women respondents' views of personal finances and national economy adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^b Women respondents' views of government responsibility for jobs adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^c Women respondents' views of government spending on child-care adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^d Women respondents' ideological positions adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^e Women respondents' views of: personal finances and national economy, government responsibility for jobs, government-spending on child-care, abortion, use of force, party-id, and ideological positions adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^f Women respondents' views of: personal finances and national economy, government responsibility for jobs, government-spending on child-care, abortion, use of force, and ideological positions adjusted to match men respondents' views.

Table 3b - 1984
Simulation: Women with Men's Preferences

Variable	Reagan	Mondale	(Reagan - Mondale)	Gender Gap
Men - Predicted (NES sample)	62.5	37.5		
Men - Predicted (logit sample)	62.4	37.8	24.6	
Predicted - Real Prefs (NES sample)	54.9	45.1		
Predicted - Real Prefs (logit sample)	58.9	41.1	17.8	6.8
Economy ^a	60.8	39.2	21.6	3.0
Govt.Jobs ^b	59.4	40.6	18.8	5.8
Food ^c	59.9	40.1	19.8	4.8
Abortion	58.8	41.2	17.6	7.0
Coop with USSR	59.5	40.5	19.0	5.6
Party ID	61.0	39.0	22.0	2.6
Ideology ^d	59.4	40.6	18.8	5.8
All of Above ^e	64.8	35.2	29.6	-5.0
All of Above ^f (except Party-ID)	63.3	36.7	26.6	-2.0

Values are predicted vote-shares of women for each candidate.

^a Women respondents' views of personal finances and national economy adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^b Women respondents' views of government responsibility for jobs adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^c Women respondents' views of government spending on child-care adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^d Women respondents' ideological positions adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^e Women respondents' views of: personal finances and national economy, government responsibility for jobs, government-spending on child-care, abortion, use of force, party-id, and ideological positions adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^f Women respondents' views of: personal finances and national economy, government responsibility for jobs, government-spending on child-care, abortion, use of force, and ideological positions adjusted to match men respondents' views.

Table 3c - 1988
Simulation: Women with Men's Preferences

Variable	Bush	Dukakis	(Bush - Dukakis)	Gender Gap
Men - Predicted (NES sample)	56.5	43.5		
Men - Predicted (logit sample)	59.2	40.8	18.4	
Predicted - Real Prefs (NES sample)	50.0	50.0		
Predicted - Real Prefs (logit sample)	55.1	44.9	10.2	8.2
Economy ^a	57.1	42.9	14.2	4.2
Govt.Jobs ^b	56.1	43.9	12.2	6.2
Food ^c	56.1	43.9	12.2	6.2
Abortion	55.0	45.0	10.0	8.4
Coop with USSR	55.2	44.8	10.4	8.0
Party ID	58.5	41.5	17.0	1.4
Ideology ^d	55.1	44.9	10.2	8.2
All of Above ^e	62.1	37.9	24.2	-5.8
All of Above ^f (except Party-ID)	59.5	40.5	19.0	-0.6

Values are predicted vote-shares of women for each candidate.

^a Women respondents' views of personal finances and national economy adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^b Women respondents' views of government responsibility for jobs adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^c Women respondents' views of government spending on child-care adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^d Women respondents' ideological positions adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^e Women respondents' views of: personal finances and national economy, government responsibility for jobs, government-spending on child-care, abortion, use of force, party-id, and ideological positions adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^f Women respondents' views of: personal finances and national economy, government responsibility for jobs, government-spending on child-care, abortion, use of force, and ideological positions adjusted to match men respondents' views.

Table 3d - 1992
Simulation: Women with Men's Preferences

Variable	Bush	Clinton	Perot	(Bush - Clinton)	Gender Gap
Men - NES Sample	34.8	42.5	22.6		
Men - Predicted (GEV sample)	35.9	40.6	23.5	-4.7	
Women - NES Sample	33.3	52.7	23.5		
Women - Predicted - (logit sample)	34.7	50.7	14.6	-16.0	11.3
Economy ^a	35.6	49.8	14.6	-13.2	8.5
Govt.Jobs ^b	35.3	50.1	14.6	-14.8	10.1
Child-Care ^c	34.1	50.0	16.0	-15.9	12.2
Abortion	35.9	49.9	14.2	-14.0	9.3
Use of Force	34.9	50.5	14.6	-15.6	10.9
Party ID	37.4	48.0	14.5	-10.2	5.5
Ideology ^d	36.0	49.7	14.3	-13.7	9.0
All of Above ^e	42.2	43.6	14.1	-1.4	-3.3
All of Above ^f (except Party-ID)	39.0	46.6	14.4	-7.7	3.0

Values are predicted vote-shares of women for each candidate.

^a Women respondents' views of personal finances and national economy adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^b Women respondents' views of government responsibility for jobs adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^c Women respondents' views of government spending on child-care adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^d Women respondents' ideological positions adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^e Women respondents' views of: personal finances and national economy, government responsibility for jobs, government-spending on child-care, abortion, use of force, party-id, and ideological positions adjusted to match men respondents' views.

^f Women respondents' views of: personal finances and national economy, government responsibility for jobs, government-spending on child-care, abortion, use of force, and ideological positions adjusted to match men respondents' views.