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Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and Weak Link Coordination Games

Camerer, Colin F. and Knez, Marc J. and Weber, Roberto A. (1996) Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and Weak Link Coordination Games. Social Science Working Paper, 970. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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Previous studies have shown that simply knowing some players move first can affect behavior in games, even when the first-movers' moves are unobservable. This observation violates the game-theoretic principle that timing of unobserved moves is irrelevant. We extend this work by varying timing of unobservable moves in ultimatum bargaining games and "weak link" coordination games. Timing without observability affects both bargaining and coordination, but only weakly. The results are consistent with theories that allow "virtual observability" of first-mover choices, rather than theories in which timing matters only because first-mover advantage is used as a principle of equilibrium selection.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Version
Camerer, Colin F.0000-0003-4049-1871
Alternate Title:Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and "Weak Link" Coordination Games
Additional Information:We thank Gary Bolton, Yuval Rottenstreich, participants in the Chicago GSB Behavioral Science brown bag lunch workshop, the Wharton Decision Processes workshop, and the 1996 Public Choice Society meeting for ideas, and NSF grant SBR-9511001 for financial support. Published as Weber, Roberto A., Colin F. Camerer, and Marc Knez. "Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and “weak link” coordination games." Experimental Economics 7, no. 1 (2004): 25-48.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Subject Keywords:timing, coordination games, experiments
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:970
Classification Code:JEL: C72, C92
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170816-134044325
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80492
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:17 Aug 2017 17:23
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:31

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