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Strategyproof and Nonbossy Assignments

Papai, Szilvia (1996) Strategyproof and Nonbossy Assignments. Social Science Working Paper, 938. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170817-155507110

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Abstract

We consider the assignment of heterogeneous and indivisible objects to agents without using monetary transfers, where each agent may be assigned more than one object, and the valuation of the objects to an agent may depend on what other objects the agent is assigned. The set of strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal social choice functions is characterized as dictatorial sequential choice functions. Thus, the consequences of a Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type result can only be escaped in this context by using bossy social choice functions. It is also established that all strategyproof, strongly nonbossy and Pareto-optimal social choice functions are serial dictatorships, where strong nonbossiness is a stricter version of bossiness.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-084355622Related ItemPublished Version
Alternate Title:Strategyproof and Nonbossy Multiple Assignments
Additional Information:I thank Kim C. Border, John O. Ledyard, Thomas R. Palfrey, and Simon Wilkie for helpful comments. Support from the Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Published as Pápai, Szilvia. "Strategyproof and nonbossy multiple assignments." Journal of Public Economic Theory 3, no. 3 (2001): 257-271.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Alfred P. Sloan FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170817-155507110
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170817-155507110
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80583
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:18 Aug 2017 18:23
Last Modified:30 Aug 2017 16:05

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