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Strategyproof Allocation of a Single Object

Papai, Szilvia (1996) Strategyproof Allocation of a Single Object. Social Science Working Paper, 936. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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The problem of allocating a single indivisible object to one of several selfish agents is considered, where monetary payments are not allowed, and the object is not necessarily desirable to each agent. It is shown that ordinality and positive responsiveness together are necessary and sufficient conditions for strategyproofness, which implies that efficient social choice functions are not strategyproof. However, any Pareto-optimal, ordinal social choice function is strategyproof. A Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type impossibility result is established for nonbossy mechanisms. Thus, the best the planner can do without monetary transfers is to give the object to an agent who desires it, but whose valuation of the object may not be the highest among the agents, using a mechanism that is either dictatorial or bossy. It is also shown that all strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal social choice functions are serial dictatorships.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:I thank Kim C. Border, John O. Leclyarcl, Thomas R. Palfrey, and Simon Wilkie for helpful comments. Support from the Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Alfred P. Sloan FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:936
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170817-161618129
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80588
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:18 Aug 2017 18:19
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:32

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