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The New Republic and the New Institutionalism: Hamilton's Plan and Extra-Legislative Organization

Alvarez, R. Michael (1995) The New Republic and the New Institutionalism: Hamilton's Plan and Extra-Legislative Organization. Social Science Working Paper, 934. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170817-162344965

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Abstract

Recent work under the "new institutionalism" rubric has emphasized the role that institutions play in majority rule legislatures. This paper applies this focus on institutions to examine why rudimentary political parties began to form in the early sessions of the United States Congress. While Constitutional structures could have provided institutional stability to the early Congresses, empirical evidence indicates that a necessary condition underlying the operation of Constitutional stability- enhancing structures was not fulfilled. It will be argued that in order to avoid the uncertainty inherent in the institution-free first two Congresses, political entrepreneurs (especially Hamilton and Madison) began to organize rough legislative factions behind particular political-economic policies. This paper will examine in particular the progress of Hamilton's fiscal plans in the first Congresses and the legislative polarization which provided the foundation upon which the Federalist and Jeffersonian Republican parties were built.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:I would like to thank John Aldrich, Robert Bates, Ruth Grant and Sarah Hamm-Alvarez for their advice and especially their patience.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:934
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170817-162344965
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170817-162344965
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80589
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:18 Aug 2017 18:18
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:32

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