A Caltech Library Service

Relationship Banking and corporate governance in the Kaiserreich

Fohlin, Caroline (1995) Relationship Banking and corporate governance in the Kaiserreich. Social Science Working Paper, 931. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

[img] PDF (sswp 931 - Jul. 1995) - Submitted Version
See Usage Policy.


Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


This paper focuses on the institution of interlocking directorates between universal banks and industrial firms in the Kaiserreich (1871-1914) and demonstrates that such formalized relationships were unusual prior to 1900. The investigation indicates further that there was a marked increase in bank representation at firms-both in the share of firms involved in such relationships and in the number of joint directors-around the turn of the century. Finally, the work suggest a number of explanations for the pattern of bank relationships that emerges.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Fohlin, Caroline0000-0002-1380-2788
Additional Information:My thanks go to Lance Davis, Barry Eichengreen, Harold James, John Latting, and Ken Snowden as well as EHA conference participants for their comments on this work Funding from the Joint Committee on Western Europe of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council (with Funds provided by the Ford and Mellon Foundations) is gratefully acknowledged. Renamed and published as Fohlin, Caroline. "The rise of interlocking directorates in imperial Germany." The Economic History Review 52, no. 2 (1999): 307-333.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:931
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170817-165303443
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80593
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:18 Aug 2017 18:15
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:32

Repository Staff Only: item control page