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A Comparison of Political Institutions in a Tiebout Model

Page, Scott E. and Kollman, Ken and Miller, John H. (1995) A Comparison of Political Institutions in a Tiebout Model. Social Science Working Paper, 926. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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In this paper, we construct a computational model of Tiebout competition. We show that the notion that Tiebout competition, as a result of enforcing efficiency, renders institutional arrangements unimportant does not preclude the possibility that political institutions may differ in their ability to sort citizens. In particular, institutions which perform poorly given a single location, may perform better when there are multiple locations because they allow for improved sorting. We demonstrate that insights from simulated annealing, a discrete nonlinear search algorithm, may explain this improvement.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:Also known as SFI WORKING PAPER: 1995-04-045
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Competition, Computational Models, Political Institutions.
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:926
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170818-135148172
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80623
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:18 Aug 2017 21:23
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:33

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