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Preferences Over Solution to the Bargaining Problem

Border, Kim C. and Segal, Uzi (1995) Preferences Over Solution to the Bargaining Problem. Social Science Working Paper, 923. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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There are several solutions to the Nash bargaining problem in the literature. Since various authors have expressed preferences for one solution over another, we find it useful to study preferences over solutions in their own right. We identify two sets of appealing axioms on such preferences that lead to unanimity in the choice of solution. Thus bargainers may be able to reach agreement on which solution to employ. Under the first set of axioms, the Nash solution is preferred to any other solution, while under the second set, a new solution, which we call the weighted linear solution, is best.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Version
Border, Kim C.0000-0003-4437-0524
Additional Information:We gratefully acknowledge stimulating suggestions from Larry Epstein, Ehud Kalai, Edi Kami, Joe Ostroy, Ariel Rubinstein, Zvi Safra, Lloyd Shapley, Joel Sobel, Bill Weiss, Bill Zame, and seminar participants at Caltech, Johns Hopkins, and Northwestern. We also thank SSHRC for financial support. Published as Border, Kim C., and Uzi Segal. "Preferences over solutions to the bargaining problem." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1997): 1-18.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)UNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Arbitration, Ambivalence, Utility functions, Lotteries, Fairness, Game theory, Mathematical monotonicity, Axioms, Social choice, Games
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:923
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170818-141404867
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80625
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:18 Aug 2017 21:27
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:33

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