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Outside Options and Social Comparison in 3-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments

Knez, Marc and Camerer, Colin F. (1995) Outside Options and Social Comparison in 3-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments. Social Science Working Paper, 920. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170818-144943716

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Abstract

We conducted ultimatum games in which a proposer offers a division of $10 to a respondent, who accepts or rejects it. If an offer is rejected, players receive a known outside option. Our proposers made simultaneous offers to two respondents, with outside options of $2 and $4. The rate of rejected offers was higher than in similar studies, around 50%, and persisted across five trials. Outside options seem to make players "egocentrically" apply different interpretations of the amount being divided, which creates persistent disagreement. And half of respondents demand more when they know other respondents are being offered more.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110211-091232218Related ItemPublished Version
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Camerer, Colin F.0000-0003-4049-1871
Additional Information:We thank participants in the Social Organization of Competition Workshop (U Chicago) and the Behavioral Decision Research in Management conference (Boston, May 1994), and the referees and special issue editor Tom Palfrey, for extremely helpful comments. Published as Knez, Marc J., and Colin F. Camerer. "Outside options and social comparison in three-player ultimatum game experiments." Games and Economic Behavior 10, no. 1 (1995): 65-94.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:920
Classification Code:JEL: 026, 215
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170818-144943716
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170818-144943716
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80628
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:18 Aug 2017 21:58
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:33

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