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A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution

Chander, Parkash and Tulkens, Henry (1994) A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution. Social Science Working Paper, 897. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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The paper highlights the relevance of the game theoretic concept of the core of a cooperative game for the design of international treaties on transfrontier pollution. Specifically, a formula is offered for allocating abatement costs between the countries involved for which the justification is of core-theoretic nature. The analysis emphasizes the strategic role of monetary transfers among the countries.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:Thanks are due to Karl Goran Maler for numerous fruitful discussions and his hospitality at the Beijer Institute for Ecological Economics, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, during May-June 1993. The first author is also grateful to California Institute of Technology for providing a stimulating environment for the completion of this work. This research is part of the Commission of the European Communities (DG XII) "Environmental Policy, International Agreements and International Trade," administered by Alistair Ulph through CEPR, London. Published as Chander, Parkash, and Henry Tulkens. "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution." In Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, pp. 176-193. Springer US, 2006.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:897
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-134728746
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80682
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:23 Aug 2017 18:24
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:33

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