A Caltech Library Service

Human Capital and Legislative Outcomes

Saving, Jason (1994) Human Capital and Legislative Outcomes. Social Science Working Paper, 889. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

[img] PDF (sswp 889 - Jun. 1994) - Submitted Version
See Usage Policy.


Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


This paper presents a model in which legislators use informational advantages to engage in rent-seeking activities. Previous work that postulated either informational asymmetries or rent-seeking behavior could not explain deviations from the median preference without reference to "committee power." Integration of these forces demonstrates that legislative outcomes need not correspond to the median preference regardless of the extent to which "committee power" is present in a legislature. In general, both procedural and informational asymmetries can induce deviations in legislative outcomes.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:I would like to thank Mike Alvarez, Rod Kiewiet, Morgan Kousser and Tom Palfrey for helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are my own.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:human capital, rent-seeking, informational asymmetries, legislature, institutions
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:889
Classification Code:JEL: D72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-144456865
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80694
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:23 Aug 2017 18:07
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:34

Repository Staff Only: item control page