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Constitutional Secession Clauses

Yang, Chen and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1993) Constitutional Secession Clauses. Social Science Working Paper, 859. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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Taking the view that constitutions are devices whereby people coordinate to specific equilibria in circumstances that allow multiple equilibria, we show that a constitutional secession clause can serve as such a device and, therefore, that such a clause is more than an empty promise or an ineffectual threat. Employing a simple three-person recursive game, we establish that under certain conditions, this game possesses two equilibria - one in which a disadvantaged federal unit secedes and is not punished by the other units in the federation, and a second equilibrium in which this unit does not secede but is punished if it chooses to do so.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:This research was partially funded by a grant from the United States Institute of Peace to the California Institute of Technology. Published as Chen, Yan, and Peter C. Ordeshook. "Constitutional secession clauses." Constitutional Political Economy 5, no. 1 (1994): 45-60.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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US Institute of PeaceUNSPECIFIED
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:859
Classification Code:JEL: D72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-154623781
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80704
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:30 Aug 2017 18:43
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:34

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