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Collusion in private value ascending price auctions

Sherstyuk, Katerina (2002) Collusion in private value ascending price auctions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 48 (2). pp. 177-195. ISSN 0167-2681. doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00215-3.

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We investigate the effects of bid improvement rules and bidder value asymmetry on bidder collusion in experimental ascending price auctions without communication. We find that the strict bid improvement rule and private values are not always sufficient to break collusion among well-motivated bidders. Collusion still occurs as long as bidder gains from collusion are high.

Item Type:Article
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Additional Information:© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. Received 5 April 2000, Revised 18 May 2001, Accepted 22 May 2001, Available online 4 April 2002. I would like to thank Tony Kwasnica, Dan Levin, Charles Plott, Roger Wilkins, the participants of the March 1999 International Symposium on New Developments in Experimental Economics (Osaka, Japan) and of the 1999 ESA annual meetings (Lake Tahoe, Nevada) for helpful discussion and suggestions. I am grateful to David Grether for suggesting significant improvements in the experimental design. My special thanks to Veronika Nemes for help in conducting experiments. Financial support by the Australian Research Council is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are my own.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Australian Research CouncilUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Auction experiments; Tacit collusion
Issue or Number:2
Classification Code:JEL: C92; D44
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-160218592
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Official Citation:Katerina Sherstyuk, Collusion in private value ascending price auctions, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 48, Issue 2, June 2002, Pages 177-195, ISSN 0167-2681, (
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80709
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:23 Aug 2017 17:03
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:38

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