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Competitive Solutions and Uniform Competitive Solutions for Cooperative Games

Stefanescu, Anton (1993) Competitive Solutions and Uniform Competitive Solutions for Cooperative Games. Social Science Working Paper, 868. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170823-145603278

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Abstract

The competitive solution and the uniform competitive solution are different solution concepts for cooperative games. The first was introduced by McKelvey, Ordeshook and Winer (1978), the second is proposed in the present paper, however, it is deriving from the same original ideas. A (uniform) competitive solution is a finite configuration of effective payoff vectors, each of them being associate to a coalition. This configuration satisfies two fundamental requirements: the internal stability and the external stability. Despite the existing differences the competitive solutions and the uniform competitive solutions have some common properties and are also related to some other classical solution-concepts. The uniform competitive solution is a modified version of the competitive solution. Some disadvantages of the earlier concept are removed and the existence theorems for very large classes of both transferable utility and non-transferable utility games are provided.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:This research was supported by the Fulbright Grant No. 16220 to the California Institute of Technology. The author wishes to thank Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook for many fruitful discussions and helpful suggestions.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Fulbright Foundation16220
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:868
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170823-145603278
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170823-145603278
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80743
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:28 Aug 2017 23:32
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:34

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