A Caltech Library Service

Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem

Bykowsky, Mark M. and Cull, Robert J. and Ledyard, John O. (2000) Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 17 (3). pp. 205-228. ISSN 0922-680X. doi:10.1023/A:1008122015102.

Full text is not posted in this repository. Consult Related URLs below.

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


In general, synergies across license valuations complicate the auction design process. Theory suggests that a “simple” (i.e., non-combinatorial) auction will have difficulty in assigning licenses efficiently in such an environment. This difficulty increases with increases in “fitting complexity.” In some environments, bidding may become “mutually destructive.” Experiments indicate that a properly designed combinatorial auction is superior to a simple auction in terms of economic efficiency and revenue generation in bidding environments with a low amount of fitting complexity. Concerns that a combinatorial auction will cause a “threshold” problem are not borne out when bidders for small packages can communicate.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ReadCube access ItemWorking Paper
Additional Information:© 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. We thank Bill Maher, Dave Porter, and Tim Sloan for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. We also thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. All remaining errors are our own.
Issue or Number:3
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170824-093443025
Persistent URL:
Official Citation:Bykowsky, M.M., Cull, R.J. & Ledyard, J.O. Journal of Regulatory Economics (2000) 17: 205.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80765
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:24 Aug 2017 23:22
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:38

Repository Staff Only: item control page