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The Design of Coordination Mechanisms and Organizational Computing

Ledyard, John O. (1993) The Design of Coordination Mechanisms and Organizational Computing. Social Science Working Paper, 836. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170825-145611518

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Abstract

We provide an introduction to a theory of coordination mechanism design and show how to apply it to an assignment problem. The purpose is to introduce those familiar with organizational computing, but unfamiliar with game theory and economics, to the subject. We also describe briefly how we can test new mechanisms before taking them into the field. Finally, we raise some unresolved research questions.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170828-145216139Related ItemPublished Version
Additional Information:This paper relies heavily on the results from an ongoing research project with Mark Olson and David Porter funded by the Flight Projects Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (NASA) through a grant to the Program on Organizational Design (PrOD) at Caltech. None of them is responsible for any errors. Published as Ledyard, John O. "The design of coordination mechanisms and organizational computing." Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce 3, no. 1 (1993): 121-134.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Funding AgencyGrant Number
JPLUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:assignment problem, mechanism design, incentive compatibility, cooperation, experimental economics.
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:836
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170825-145611518
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170825-145611518
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80809
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:28 Aug 2017 20:50
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:35

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