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Trading in a Pure Exchange Economy without an Auctioneer: An Experimental Approach

Porter, David and Rangel, Antonio (1993) Trading in a Pure Exchange Economy without an Auctioneer: An Experimental Approach. Social Science Working Paper, 822. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170828-140533521

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Abstract

This paper explores alternatives to the vVa1rasian Auctioneer for the allocation of resources in a pure exchange economy lacking a bilateral coincidence of wants. We have created three different computerized trading processes called BARTER, NUMERAIRE, and CARE (acronym for Computer Assisted Resource Exchange). CARE is a "smart market" in the sense that it contains computer algorithms that assist users in finding a coincidence of wants. The experimental results show that CARE outperforms BARTER and NUMERAIRE by extracting most of the gains from exchange with fewer contracts, lower volume, smaller utility swings, and lower variances in final utility positions.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Flight Projects Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. All of the software design and implementation are the work of Wesley Boudville. Without his infinite patience and expert programming skills the Cassini Resource Exchange would not be a reality. We also thank John Casani and Dennis Malson who are the driving force for this new form of science management, and especially John Ledyard for his in any comments and encouragement.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Funding AgencyGrant Number
JPLUNSPECIFIED
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:822
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170828-140533521
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170828-140533521
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80857
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:28 Aug 2017 21:39
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:35

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