Duggan, John and Schwartz, Thomas (1992) Strategic Manipulability is Inescapable: Gibbard-Satterthwaite without Resoluteness. Social Science Working Paper, 817. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170828-150133697
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Abstract
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of collective-choice procedures treats only of resolute procedures. Few real or reasonable procedures are resolute. We prove a generalization of Gibbard-Satterthwaite that covers the nonresolute case. It opens harder questions than it answers about the prediction of behavior and outcomes and the design of institutions.
| Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) | ||||
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| Additional Information: | We thank Peter Ordeshook, Thomas Palfrey, Charles Plott, and Martin van Hees for helpful discussions. Schwartz thanks the UCLA Senate for research support. | ||||
| Group: | Social Science Working Papers | ||||
| Funders: |
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| Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper | ||||
| Issue or Number: | 817 | ||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20170828-150133697 | ||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170828-150133697 | ||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||
| ID Code: | 80867 | ||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||
| Deposited On: | 28 Aug 2017 23:05 | ||||
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:35 |
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