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Strategic Manipulability is Inescapable: Gibbard-Satterthwaite without Resoluteness

Duggan, John and Schwartz, Thomas (1992) Strategic Manipulability is Inescapable: Gibbard-Satterthwaite without Resoluteness. Social Science Working Paper, 817. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of collective-choice procedures treats only of resolute procedures. Few real or reasonable procedures are resolute. We prove a generalization of Gibbard-Satterthwaite that covers the nonresolute case. It opens harder questions than it answers about the prediction of behavior and outcomes and the design of institutions.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:We thank Peter Ordeshook, Thomas Palfrey, Charles Plott, and Martin van Hees for helpful discussions. Schwartz thanks the UCLA Senate for research support.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:817
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170828-150133697
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80867
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:28 Aug 2017 23:05
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:35

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