A Caltech Library Service

Veto games: Spatial committees under unanimity rule

Chen, Yan and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1998) Veto games: Spatial committees under unanimity rule. Public Choice, 97 (4). pp. 617-643. ISSN 0048-5829. doi:10.1023/A:1004951809854.

Full text is not posted in this repository. Consult Related URLs below.

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


There exists a large literature on two-person bargaining games and distribution games (or divide-the-dollar games) under simple majority rule, where in equilibrium a minimal winning coalition takes full advantage over everyone else. Here we extend the study to an n-person veto game where players take turns proposing policies in an n-dimensional policy space and everybody has a veto over changes in the status quo. Briefly, we find a Nash equilibrium where the initial proposer offers a policy in the intersection of the Pareto optimal set and the Pareto superior set that gives everyone their continuation values, and punishments are never implemented. Comparing the equilibrium outcomes under two different agendas – sequential recognition and random recognition – we find that there are advantages generated by the order of proposal under the sequential recognition rule. We also provide some conditions under which the players will prefer to rotate proposals rather than allow any specific policy to prevail indefinitely.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemWorking Paper ReadCube access
Additional Information:© 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Accepted 13 August 1996. The authors wish to thank Elizabeth Gerber, Richard McKelvey and Scott Page for their comments on earlier drafts of the paper. This research was partially funded by a grant from the United States Institute of Peace to the California Institute of Technology.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
US Institute of PeaceUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:4
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-110311657
Persistent URL:
Official Citation:Chen, Y. & Ordeshook, P.C. Public Choice (1998) 97: 617.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80900
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:29 Aug 2017 18:11
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:39

Repository Staff Only: item control page