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On Incentives and Updating in Agent Based Models

Page, Scott E. (1997) On Incentives and Updating in Agent Based Models. Computational Economics, 10 (1). pp. 67-87. ISSN 0927-7099. doi:10.1023/A:1008625524072.

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This paper introduces the concept of incentive based asynchronous updating in which the order of updating is determined by incentives. Previously, asynchronous updating has been shown to yield greater stability than synchromous updating for a variety of dynamical systems. However, in those models the order of updating is random. When incentives determine the ordering, the dynamics and end states change. For a conformity model on a two dimensional cellular automata, incentive based asynchronous updating yields greater linear disparity. Fot the game of life, it results in much greater sensitivity to initial conditions.

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Additional Information:© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Accepted 21 February 1996. Bob Axelrod, Jenna Bednar, Ann Bell, Thad Brown, Colin Camerer, Bernardo Huberman, Mike McBurnett and students in a computational economics class at UCLA helped to refine the ideas put forth in this paper.
Subject Keywords:game of life; cellular automata; conformity; dynamical systems; complex systems
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-130040971
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Official Citation:Page, S.E. Computational Economics (1997) 10: 67.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80904
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:30 Aug 2017 17:48
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:39

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