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WHY WERE THERE BLACK SCHOOLS IN THE SEGREGATED SOUTH? THE EXIT EXPLANATION RECONSIDERED

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ABSTRACT

African-American geographic mobility plays a central and somewhat contradictory role in Robert Margo's Race and Schooling in the South, 1880-1950. [1990] On the one hand, it is the solution to what Margo calls "Myrdal's Paradox." Blacks, in Margo's view, forced white school boards to spend at least *some* money on black schools after disfranchisement by threatening to deprive white planters of a labor force if black schools were *too* terrible. On the other hand, geographic mobility was the result of that solution to Myrdal's Paradox. Blacks who migrated north, Margo showed, were likely to be relatively well educated. In an article that accompanied his book, Margo elaborated a model of school board action in the legally segregated, post-disfranchisement South and briefly examined a small amount of data that he claimed was "broadly consistent with the model." [1991, p. 67.] In this paper, I consider extensive evidence, largely from the period before 1910, that bears on the first part of Margo's argument. Since almost none of that evidence corroborates his thesis, I conclude that explanations other than black geographic mobility must account for the pattern of support for black schools in the South during the era of legalized segregation.

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[1] An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Social Science History Association Convention in 1991. I want to thank Shawn Everett Kantor for valuable comments.

WHY WERE THERE BLACK SCHOOLS IN THE SEGREGATED SOUTH? THE EXIT EXPLANATION RECONSIDERED

In *An American Dilemma*, Gunnar Myrdal wondered why, after African-Americans were largely disfranchised in the South around the turn of the century, "the principle of the Negroes' right to public education was not renounced altogether." [1944, p. 888.] Writing in the midst of the anti-Nazi war, the Swedish social democrat found the most appealing answer to be that white southerners so deeply shared the fundamental American belief in egalitarianism that, however racist, they could not engage in absolute discrimination. To deprive blacks of education altogether would have been too unfair, too un-American--stump rhetoric about education spoiling good field hands to the contrary notwithstanding. [Preston, 1894, p. 221 for the rhetoric.] "The American Creed, backed by the Constitution, showed itself strong enough not to allow the sacred principle of public education to succumb," Myrdal grandly concluded.

Margo considered this ideological explanation "redundant." As he pointed out, courts intervened under both state and federal constitutional provisions to insure at least a basic level of education for southern blacks, and they simply would not have allowed a total destruction of black education. Northern philanthropists and southern bureaucrats encouraged and partially funded better black schools. Southern white self-interest in slightly more literate cooks, tenants, and farm laborers implied some, though not much support for African-American schools. But Margo preferred an explanation that allowed the masses of blacks at least an indirect role in preserving their educational opportunities. Following Charles Tiebout and Albert Hirschman, Margo suggested that blacks could employ the last weapon of the powerless--exit. [Tiebout, 1956; Hirschman, 1970.] "The final resolution of Myrdal's paradox," Margo declared, "is the mobility model. Black families would leave an area if the provision of schools for their children were seriously threatened." [1990, p. 48.] "Exit, in the case of segregated schools, was a partial substitute for political voice." [1991, p. 62.][2]

Although in both his book and his article, he qualified these strong assertions, admitting that equalization did not begin to take hold in the Deep South before the 1920s, and that it required concerted court actions by the NAACP in the 1930s and 40s to make *Plessy* v. *Ferguson*'s "equal but separate" jibe a reality, Margo's mobility thesis still deserves attention.

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[2] For a similar argument about the effect of exit on racial violence, see Tolnay and Beck, 1992.

How effective was exit in this case? Must Myrdal's thesis be dismissed out of hand, in keeping with the more skeptical, sardonic, despairing view of race relations typical of the *fin-de-siecle* malaise? Should explanations that stress the actions or potential actions of judges, philanthropists, and bureaucrats--those sixties heroes--be deemphasized as unsuited to the present knowingly cynical moment? Are governmental actions that restructure rules, such as southern disfranchisement, inevitably ineffective in America, because exit can act as an "invisible hand" to restore a new equilibrium? Do attempts at amelioration, such as increasing expenditures on black schools in an effort to prevent the labor force from migrating, generally lead to consequences unintended by their proponents--in this case, raising the job qualifications of potential migrants, and, therefore, their migration rates? In the largest sense, can politics, broadly defined to include court actions, make a difference, or is it largely an epiphenomenon?

Margo's model of local government discrimination added taxes and government spending to a constant returns production function model in which capital was white and labor was black. Laborers enjoyed no political power, but could move costlessly from community to community within each state. School boards, perfectly reflecting the white community's undifferentiated interest, preferred to maximize taxes on blacks and minimize services provided to them, but they could not because of implicit or explicit black threats to leave. If laborers had enough choices of places to which to go, racial discrimination by government, which Margo defined as spending on African-Americans less than they paid in taxes, must have been limited [1991, pp. 62-65].

The assumptions underlying this model are so flawed and unrealistic as to render it largely useless. First, Margo assumed that all labor was nonwhite, when, in fact, two-thirds of the tenant farmers in the eleven ex-Confederate states in 1910 were white [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1914, p. 297]. Because white labor could substitute for black labor, there was much less incentive to hold black labor in a community than Margo suggested. Furthermore, treating all whites as a homogeneous employer class hides the fact that some whites, those who did not employ any black laborers, might well have been indifferent to black out-migration. And others, landless white farmers or artisans, might actually have benefited economically if their black competitors were to leave. Second, contrary to the spirit of Tiebout's mobility hypothesis, Margo assumed that every African-American household had identical tastes for education, which Margo treated as the exemplary government good. In Tiebout's world, individuals with different tastes sort themselves into geographically distinct groups in order to consume the packages of taxes and services offered by different local governmental units that best satisfy their preferences. In Margo's, since every African-American wanted the same package, every government, in equilibrium,

should have supplied it. But, in fact, there were wide variations in expenditures on black schools, both within and between southern states. (See Table 3, below.)

Third, Margo assumed that white employers could bargain with black laborers only by proposing a level of taxes and services, and that blacks could respond only by staying or leaving. But surely individual employers could have varied wages or working conditions, and at some level, to some individual blacks, such incentives would have outweighed county-to-county differences in school quality. And blacks could have petitioned, cajoled, reasoned with, or struck against local whites in order to obtain better schools, or, particularly during the 1920s and 1930s, they could have sought help from northern philanthropic foundations and state education departments. [Newby, 1973, 92-93.] Ever since the Civil War, moreover, blacks had built or helped to build and maintain schools and teachers for themselves. [Anderson, 1988.] In other words, whites did not have to act only through government in order to try to maintain a supply of labor, and blacks, though deprived of the vote, were not entirely powerless, stripped of every weapon except exit.

Fourth, blacks were not the only people disfranchised in the South, nor were they only ones to suffer educational disadvantages or to be geographically mobile [Kousser, 1974 and 1980]. Poor whites, especially those from districts whose schools had little or no urban, railroad, mining, manufacturing, or plantation wealth to tax, lacked the political power to guarantee their children adequate schools, and many of them appear to have migrated in the direction of better schools. [Whitfield, 1904, p. 11; Martin, 1907, pp. 13-14.] As Tables 1-3, below, attest, black and white interstate mobility within and from the South was both large and variable, especially after 1910, and the state with the highest level of school expenditures on whites after 1915, Florida, also had by far the highest white net in-migration. Conversely, North Carolina, which had the lowest level of expenditures on white schools of any southern state for which data is available from 1880 to 1920, consistently lost white population up to that date. (See Tables 1-3.) If school boards responded to the departures of whites as Margo suggests that the boards did to those of blacks, then the ratio of spending on white schools to spending on black schools, as well as of comparative school terms and other indicators of educational quality, should have remained high, not declined, as it did in many areas after 1920.

Not only is his model seriously flawed, but Margo's evidence is also extremely sparse.[3] For Louisiana parishes (counties) in 1920, 1930, and 1940, Margo regressed the change in the length of the school year for blacks on the one-period-lagged change in the percentage of the total population that was black in the parish and a dummy for the 1930s. If the percentage of blacks went down disproportionately in a particular parish in one decade, he reasoned, then white school officials should have responded by disproportionately increasing the length of the school term in the parish during the next decade. The results are at best mixed--a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the 1920s, but a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the 1930s.

The dependent variable that Margo employed is also unsatisfactory. The inequality between black and white terms was never nearly as wide as that between expenditures on teachers' salaries or school building and upkeep. In Louisiana in 1885, for instance, the length of a school term for whites in an average parish was 4.71 months, and for blacks, 4.66 months, a ratio of 1.01:1. Expenditures per enrolled child in the same year, however, amounted to $5.42 for whites, but only $2.13 for blacks, a ratio of 2.54:1. In South Carolina in 1910, the ratio of white to black term lengths was 1.74:1, while that between white to black expenditures for teachers' salaries was 5.26:1. In Alabama in 1899, the ratios were 1.18:1 and 2.58:1; in Texas in 1910, 1.06:1 and 1.95:1. One school with a four or five month term might have a hundred students in an ungraded class jammed into a ramshackle wooden hut and taught by a person who barely knew more than his or her students. [Wish, 1964, p. 197.] Another might have graded, manageably small classes, a decent brick building, and an experienced, certificated teacher. Surely a black or white parent contemplating whether or not to move would evaluate more about the schools than the lengths of their terms. Expenditure measures would capture all of these facets--term length, building and maintenance, student/teacher ratio, and teacher quality, at least insofar as that quality was

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[3] Margo also reprints data on the estimated expenditures for black schools and the estimated taxes that blacks paid for schools in the eleven ex-Confederate states and three border states from a 1973 dissertation. [Smith, 1973]. In fact, full tax and spending data is available by race for only one of the fourteen states for the whole period that Smith covers, 1870-1910, and Smith's estimation methods are wildly speculative. In any case, a small difference between the amount expended on black schools and the amount of taxes that they paid is compatible with a number of models besides Margo's exit thesis. [Kousser, 1980].

reflected in the salary received--while the term length would measure only a small part of the educational production function.[4]

Margo's independent variable is also problematic, since the black percentage of the population is a function not only of black, but also of white migration patterns. If whites as well as blacks moved to richer areas in search of better educational opportunities, then the black percentage in a county might have remained constant over time, even if Margo's model is fundamentally correct. If whites moved into a county to get better schools or for other reasons, then the black percentage might have declined, even if no blacks immigrated. If, for a whole complex of reasons, only some having to do with education, a higher percentage of blacks than of whites stayed in a county, then the black percentage would have increased, even though more blacks than whites might have been dissatisfied with their schools.

A closer look at Tables 1-3 suggests that changes in school expenditures were not very important determinants of mobility rates. Texas, with the highest level of spending on blacks from 1890 on, lost black population in every decade from the 1880s to the 1930s. If African-Americans in other southern states had been motivated solely by a desire to improve their educational opportunities, they would have moved to Texas, swamping the outflow from Texas to the North and Far West. Educational expenditures for blacks in Louisiana were disproportionately low for the region after 1890, but its out-migration was comparatively moderate. Schools for whites in South Carolina improved dramatically from 1915 to 1930, but whites still left in droves. Although the available statistics are too fragmentary to enable one to subject the relationships between migration and school expenditures to more systematic statistical analysis at the state level (because states did not always segregate their published statistics as faithfully as they did their schools), the overall lack of pattern is clear.

(Tables 1-3 about here.)

One more facet of Table 3 should be pointed out. In most areas for most periods, the level of black expenditures per student did not actually decline absolutely, but only relative

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[4] Although comparing expenditures across races may be somewhat problematic, because such expenditures are functions of the amount of racial discrimination against *teachers*, as well as against *students*, such considerations are irrelevant here, for the comparisons are within races, not between them. Furthermore, the mobility thesis is much more plausible for teachers than for parents. Before the days of civil service protection, tenure, and benefits that accrued over time, teachers were free to respond purely to salary incentives, and school boards were unfettered in being able to discharge teachers who were "worth" less than they were paid. Contemporary school administrators were well aware of such matters. See, e.g., Pound, 1910, pp. 133-34.

to that for whites.[5] If blacks compared the quality of their schools with those of whites in the same area, then the relevant dependent variable should be relative racial expenditures. If blacks compared current conditions to those in their own schools at an earlier period, or to those of contemporary black schools in other places, then the dependent variable should be the level of segregated expenditures or changes in that level. In the analysis below, I assume, as Margo implicitly did, that the principal objects of comparison for blacks and whites were schools for their own race.[6]

Below the state level, it is possible to analyze statistics for seven of the eleven ex-Confederate states.[7] Tables 5-7 and 9-12 have a common format and are based on all the segregated expenditure data that is available at approximately five-year intervals from 1880 to 1910 for the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia. Table 8 substitutes a term-length dependent variable in the state, Alabama, where that information is most plentiful. Instead of changes in the black population percentage, I have used those in the number of schoolage children enrolled, separately for each race, as a much more direct measure of migration due to educational concerns. It also avoids the relative migration problem mentioned above. Instead of the length of the school term, I have focused on expenditures, or, when this is unavailable, on by far the largest component of spending, that for teachers' salaries. To avoid overemphasizing small counties or those with few blacks, I have divided the enrollment changes by the earlier year's enrollment and weighted each regression by the square root of the same enrollment figure.

The years before 1910 provide a better test of Margo's thesis than those after 1920 for three reasons: First, disparities in expenditures were growing rapidly in the earlier era; whereas, those disparities were reduced later, particularly after 1930. If black parents were ever going to act as Margo suggests that they did, it should have been at the nadir of discrimination, not when spending inequalities were being alleviated by rapidly increasing

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[5] How real levels of expenditures changed is very difficult to determine. Applying any generally available cost of living index to the rural South, especially to the cost of buildings and salaries of people who nearly always were only part-time teachers, seems an exercise less in futility than in fiction.

[6] Had blacks' decisions to move depended on interracial comparisons, Margo's thesis would be so obviously at variance with the facts of migration as to be unworthy of consideration. As Tables 1-3 show, the greatest amounts of black emigration from the South came when the trend of expenditures was toward racial equalization.

[7] I have not yet completed the task of converting the massive amounts of data from the 254 Texas counties into machine-readable form.

relative funding for black schools. Second, once the pattern of educational discrimination settled in, school boards should have been less easily convinced that black decisions to migrate would depend on the quality of their schools. If blacks stayed when their schools were miserable, why should white school boards believe later that improving schools at a more rapid rate would prevent African-Americans from leaving?[8] Third, during the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth, black education in the South was so poor, especially in the rural areas, that even dramatic improvements would not have equipped young African-Americans to migrate north. While it is possible that during the 1920s and after, the actions of white school officials in improving black schools unintentionally contributed to black migration out of the South, this unintended consequence seems much less likely in the years before World War I. Thus, it is to this earlier period, not the 1920s or later, that the Margo mobility thesis should apply most strongly.

I have operationalized the thesis in three different sets of equations.[9] In the first set, which I will refer to as "Equations A", changes in enrollment from the first to the second period were assumed to be reactions to expenditure levels in the first period. In other words, people observed the amount spent in the schools where they were, and if they were dissatisfied, they subsequently moved to areas of greater spending. This variable stresses the actions of parents and children, not officials, and is therefore the least related to Margo's model, which emphasizes the actions of school boards. If Margo's thesis is correct, the signs of the coefficients of the independent variables in these equations, EXB, should be positive. In the second set ("Equations B"), changes in expenditures from the second to the third period are hypothesized to be a function of changes in enrollments from the first to the second period. School boards, in this model, responded to extraordinarily large drops in enrollment by increasing spending more rapidly than the average county did. Margo would

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[8] For a similar argument used to dismiss the comparative regional quality of schools for blacks as a factor in the "Great Migration" of blacks from the U.S. South to the North, see Higgs, 1976, 337.

[9] Like Margo, I have used bivariate OLS regression equations to test his hypothesis. Naturally, other factors than schooling entered into the decisions of parents and school boards. But if parents could signal their satisfaction only by moving or staying, and if school boards would change black expenditure levels only in response to parents' mobility decisions, then the influence of other variables on mobility ought to have made no difference. Suppose the model is correct and black parents observed that a local school board has raised spending levels, or that it was spending a high amount on black schools, relative to school boards elsewhere. Then, regardless of *why* the board had acted, black families should have remained in the area, or moved to it. Or suppose that a school board observed blacks leaving, for whatever reason. Then it should have raised black expenditures, if it were acting in accordance with Margo's hypothesis. For this simple theory, then, a bivariate regression is entirely appropriate.

expect the coefficients of ENCB in these equations to be negative. The third set ("Equations C"), which has the same rationale as the second, but assumes a shorter reaction time, is based on the supposition that the school board set the expenditure level in the second period in response to changes in enrollment between the first and second periods. Again, the signs of ENCB should be negative if the model is correct. If enrollment fell disproportionately, expenditures should have risen to disproportionately high levels. All three sets of equations seem to me to be plausible representations of facets of Margo's mobility model. In all equations, the values of the coefficients based on the white schools should have been less than or of opposite sign from those for black schools, because white expenditures were generally rising at much more rapid rates than those for blacks during this period, and because many whites could express themselves through a political "voice," rather than just through a nonpolitical "exit."

(Table 4 about here.)

Because Margo focused on data from Louisiana, let us start there.[10] Table 5 reveals that the coefficients for blacks are often of the predicted signs, but are statistically significant less than half of the time. The greater the expenditure in a parish (EXB), the greater the increase in enrollment over the next five years in that parish, relative to other parishes.[11] The less the increase in enrollment over the previous five years (ENCB), the greater the expenditure level, again relative to that in other parishes. But, contrary to expectation, the greater the increase in enrollment over the previous five years (ENCB), the *greater* the increase in expenditure over the next five years (EXCB). Of the fourteen slope coefficients (C) for the black equations, only six are significant at the 0.05 level for a one-tailed test, five in the predicted direction, and one in the other direction. Three of the five concern black parental action, not school board action. Moreover, the signs of nine of the fourteen pairs of equations for the whites are the same as those for the blacks, though only one of the fourteen is statistically significant.

(Table 5 about here.)

Louisiana fits Margo's hypothesis better than the other states do. In Mississippi, only one of the twenty-two slope coefficients is significant, and eight of the eleven for blacks

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[10] The information available in reports of the southern state superintendents of education varied from year to year. Although I attempted to use data from years divisible by five, in some cases, that was impossible. I have consequently substituted the nearest year in which the requisite data was printed.

[11] This parallels the finding in Tolnay and Beck, 1992, 112-13.

have the "wrong" signs. (See Table 6.) Twelve of the twenty-eight signs for expenditures in Alabama are significant, but only four of the fourteen for blacks are both significant and in the predicted direction. Three of the coefficients for blacks are significant, but in the wrong direction, and nine of the fourteen pairs of equations for whites and blacks have coefficients with the same signs. (See Table 7.) Alabama is also the only state with a sufficiently long series of term length data for this period to make analysis useful. Only two of the eighteen equations to predict term lengths in Alabama have significant coefficients (one for whites and one for blacks), and both go counter to Margo's prediction. (See Table 8.) Moving east and then north, the box scores for significant coefficients in the predicted directions are two of sixteen for Georgia, one of sixteen for Florida, five of thirty-four for North Carolina, and two of sixteen for Virginia. In the forty-one of the equations that relate to blacks in these four states, there are only eleven statistically significant coefficients, and five of the eleven are in the wrong direction. Of the forty-one pairs of equations for blacks and whites in the four states, twenty-five pairs have the same signs. (See Tables 9-12.)

(Tables 6-12 about here.)

Overall, the scorecards are unimpressive on the ninety regressions for each race. For blacks, twenty-six equations have statistically significant slope coefficients, but eleven of them have signs opposite to those that Margo's model implies. Sixty-four have signs that cannot be distinguished from zero. For whites, the comparable totals are ten, twelve, and sixty-eight.[12] In the case of neither race does the relation between migration and expenditure changes seem impressive, and, to the extent that there was any relation at all, it was similar for people of both races. Apparently, other factors, such as comparative economic opportunity, considerably outweighed the quality of schools in migration decisions, as traditional models predict. (E.g., Fligstein, 1981.) At least on this evidence, it was not the threat of exit, but other considerations that caused school boards to continue and even at times to make improvements in black public education after disfranchisement.

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[12] Unweighted versions of the same equations yield the following numbers of statistically significant and correct, statistically significant and incorrect, and non-significant coefficients: for blacks, eighteen, eight, and sixty-four; for whites, nine, nineteen, and sixty-two. For equations using raw enrollment changes, rather than enrollment changes divided by enrollment in the first year, the analogous totals are 11, 5, and 74 for blacks, and 12, 16, and 62 for whites. The story is thus essentially the same for these 180 regressions as for the 90 weighted regressions: Margo's model fits well a fifth or less of the time for blacks, and even though it was not meant to apply to whites, it fits them well a tenth or more of the time.

Among the most important of those other considerations was undoubtedly the threat of legal action under the Fourteenth Amendment and various state laws and constitutional provisions that usually dated from Reconstruction and often remained in southern state constitutions even after disfranchisement. Adopted in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment, of course, required that no state deny any person "the equal protection of the laws." Some state constitutions contained "equal benefit" clauses, such as Article 13 of the 1875 Alabama constitution: "The General Assembly shall establish, organize and maintain a system of public schools throughout the State for the equal benefit of the children thereof. . . ."[13] Even though the extreme racist 1901 Alabama constitutional convention deleted the equal benefit clause and significantly weakened the protections for black education, Article IV of the new state constitution did require that, within each county, school funds had to be apportioned so as to provide "as nearly as practicable, school terms of equal duration . . ." in each school. [Alabama, 1940, p. 4163.] Even Mississippi at least formally guaranteed a minimum term length for every school in the state, black and white. [Preston, 1892, pp. 14-15.]

Federal and state judges enforced such provisions inconsistently, often deferring to flagrantly inegalitarian state legislatures. [Kousser, 1986.] But black citizens did bring cases, apparently without reprisal, did manage to secure highly qualified counsel, and did win important victories against the grossest racial inequities.[14] In Kentucky in 1883, for instance, a federal judge declared that the Fourteenth Amendment "must and can only mean that the laws of the states must be equal in their benefit as well as equal in their burdens, and that less would not be 'the equal protection of the laws.'" [*Claybrook* v. *Owensboro*, 16 Fed. 297 (1883).] Accordingly, he ruled a law providing that taxes paid by whites would be spent only on white schools unconstitutional. Three years later the North Carolina Supreme Court threw out a similar law primarily on the grounds that it violated that state's constitutional mandate that, except for segregation, "there shall be no discrimination in favor of or to the prejudice of either race" in public schools. [*Puitt* v. *Gaston County*, 94 N.C. 709 (1886).] In the same period, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided that school boards must operate black schools for the same terms as white schools. No school board, the Court

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13 This provision was construed quite strictly in, for instance, *Elsberry* v. *Seay*, 83 Ala. 614. For similar laws or constitutional provisions, see, e.g., Hanford, 1878, p. 82; Skillman, 1928, pp. 203-06.

14 In northern states, blacks often won the right to attend integrated schools. See Kousser, 1986, 1991.

declaimed, had the right to single out children "by the arbitrary standard of color, and deprive them of the benefits of the school privilege." [*Maddox* v. *Neal*, 45 Ark. 121 (1885).] Legal overtones of Myrdal's American Creed reverberated even in the South, and that rhetoric was by no means wholly empty, even in the darkest periods of southern racism.

The interplay of the American Creed, white supremacist ideology, and constitutional protections is perhaps nowhere more clearly in evidence than in the 1899 annual report of South Carolina state education superintendent John J. McMahan, who had been a prominent member of the state's 1895 constitutional convention and a stalwart proponent of the disfranchisement of blacks and poor whites there. [McMahan, 1900.] "The principle of public education," McMahan proclaimed, "means that the State will not allow the unfortunate circumstances of parents to doom the children to grow up to life's responsibilities without training and without enlightenment. . . . The State cannot consistently omit any from this care. . . . The State is a unit, and must care for all her members. The welfare of the whole is dependent upon the welfare of every part." [pp. 21-22.] Yet McMahan favored only a limited public education for African-Americans: "The elements of reading, writing and arithmetic are valuable to every human being, but beyond these the ordinary school branches are of far less value to a negro than habits of industry and the learning of a trade. The best type of the negro of intelligence and character is a mechanic educated in that best of schools--the well governed plantation before the [Civil] War." [p.14, capitalization as in original.] Still, McMahan opposed separating property and poll taxes by race and funding black schools with black taxes alone: "Even if this plan, some times suggested, were not unconstitutional, it is wrong in principle. The State as a whole must provide the right sort of education for the negroes in her jurisdiction." [p.9.][15] Two years later, McMahan's Florida counterpart, William N. Sheats, raised the rhetorical stakes even higher: "I sincerely believe [that] to leave the negro in ignorance would be suicidal to the South, and to declare by any action a policy of opposition to the education of this people would discountenance the section before all enlightened people of the world, not to mention the moral and religious principles involved in the sight of God." [Sheats, 1903, pp. 448-50.] Although the American Creed and the various state and national laws and constitutional provisions did not fulfill the promise of equality or wipe out prejudice, they did set limits on inequality. Politics, the Constitution, and national ideals mattered, even to American racists.

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15 For an extensive discussion of the unconstitutionality of racially separate taxation, see Alabama, 1940, pp. 4163, 4274-4310.

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Table 1
Net Number Migrating by Decade, by Race, 1870-1950 (00 omitted)

State	1870s		1880s		1890s	
	White	Black	W	B	W	B
AL	-406	-390	-111	-135	-575	-106
AR	579	294	312	447	-1079	-99
FL	77	22	251	104	103	271
GA	-319	-211	-322	162	-331	-228
LA	-190	-45	-105	-75	104	-257
MS	-398	118	-567	-258	-452	-205
NC	80	-56	-27	-351	-265	-340
SC	153	158	-12	-119	-3	-501
TN	-742	-224	-497	-151	-616	-140
TX	2529	83	854	-10	657	-27
VA	-222	-475	-466	-632	-364	-855

State	1900s		1910s		1920s	
	W	B	W	B	W	B
AL	-313	-219	-354	-750	-649	-751
AR	-754	171	-827	-2	-1845	-671
FL	474	398	910	-79	2266	531
GA	-220	-193	-12	-662	-1506	-2542
LA	130	-251	-101	-468	-121	-430
MS	-214	-349	-781	-1302	-290	-820
NC	-488	-173	-375	-200	256	-88
SC	12	-536	40	-604	-448	-1950
TN	-1147	-282	-783	-250	-754	-80
TX	16	-341	-630	-55	1067	-146
VA	-169	-238	84	-105	-920	-1008

State	1930s		1940s	
	W	B	W	B
AL	-931	-532	-995	-1637
AR	-1144	-426	-2292	-1298
FL	2011	436	4388	-1
GA	-170	-635	-216	-1767
LA	168	-64	-119	-1223
MS	-212	-517	-937	-2584
NC	-106	-545	-758	-1301
SC	49	-674	-133	-1490
TN	94	150	-396	-350
TX	-779	106	949	-788
VA	716	-91	2060	-144

Source: Computed by averaging the "census survival" and "state of birth" estimates in Tables 1.11 and 1.15 in Simon Kuznets and Dorothy Swain Thomas, *Population Redistribution and Economic Growth* (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1957), Vol. I.

Table 2
Net Percentage Migrating by Decade, by Race, 1870-1950

State	1870s		1880s		1890s		1900s	
	White	Black	W	B	W	B	W	B
AL	-7.0	-7.3	-1.5	-2.2	-6.4	-1.4	-2.8	-2.5
AR	+12.4	+17.6	+4.5	+17.2	-12.5	-3.0	-7.4	+4.2
FL	+6.8	+2.0	+14.7	+7.1	+4.3	+13.8	+13.8	+14.9
GA	-4.5	-3.3	-3.7	+2.1	-3.1	-2.4	-1.7	-1.8
LA	-5.4	-1.1	-2.3	-1.5	+1.8	-4.3	+1.7	-3.7
MS	-9.5	+2.2	-11.3	-3.7	-7.7	-2.5	-3.1	-3.7
NC	+1.1	-1.2	-0.3	-6.4	-2.3	-5.8	-3.6	-2.6
SC	+4.6	+3.1	0.0	-1.9	0.0	-6.8	0.0	-6.6
TN	-7.3	-6.2	-4.1	-3.6	-4.4	-3.1	-7.2	-5.9
TX	+31.9	+2.6	+6.4	0.0	+3.4	0.0	0.0	-5.2
VA	-2.8	-8.3	-5.0	-10.0	-3.4	-13.2	-1.3	-3.6

State	1910s		1920s		1930s		1940s	
	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B
AL	-2.7	-8.3	-4.2	-8.2	-5.3	-5.5	-5.1	-16.7
AR	-7.0	0	-14.1	-14.5	-8.1	-8.9	-15.7	-28.6
FL	+18.1	-2.6	+28.9	+14.1	+17.6	+9.3	+26.2	0
GA	0	-5.6	-8.7	-22.4	-0.1	-5.9	-1.0	-16.5
LA	-1.1	-6.7	-2.1	-5.9	+1.2	-0.8	-0.8	-14.1
MS	-9.7	-13.4	-3.2	-8.4	+2.0	-5.0	-8.3	-25.1
NC	-2.3	-2.8	+1.3	-1.1	-0.5	-5.7	-2.7	-12.7
SC	+0.5	-7.1	-5.1	-23.5	+0.5	-8.4	-1.1	-18.2
TN	-4.4	-5.4	-3.8	-1.8	+0.4	+3.1	-1.6	-6.7
TX	-1.9	-0.8	+2.6	-1.3	-1.6	+1.1	+1.6	-8.3
VA	+0.6	-1.5	-5.5	-15.0	+3.8	-1.4	+9.1	-2.1

Source: Computed by averaging the "census survival" and "state of birth" estimates in Tables 1.12 and 1.15 in Simon Kuznets and Dorothy Swain Thomas, *Population Redistribution & Economic Growth* (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1957) Vol. I.

Table 3
Expenditures Per Child in Schoolage Population, By Race

State	1880		1885		1890	
	W	B	W	B	W	B
AL	na	na	1.28	1.10	1.09	0.92
AR	na					
FL	na	na	na	na	na	na
GA	na	na	na	na	na	na
LA	na	na	*5.42	*2.13	*4.68	*2.21
MS	na	na	na	na	3.00	1.17
NC	0.72	0.74	0.93	0.98	1.07	0.94
SC	na	na	na	na	na	na
TN	na					
TX	na		#1.15	#0.79	#3.68	#2.89
VA	na	na	na	na	2.39	1.13

	1895		1900		1905		1910	
	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B
AL	*2.32	*1.40	1.39	0.54	2.85	0.67	6.21	1.02
AR	na							
FL	5.85	2.35	6.66	2.24	#6.77	#1.50	12.14	2.99
GA	*2.23	*1.06	*2.86	*1.36	*4.58	*1.81	7.90	1.05
LA	*5.19	*1.67	5.57	0.87	5.39	0.61	8.74	0.91
MS	3.43	1.26	3.44	1.14	*6.01	*1.94	5.03	1.07
NC	1.17	1.02	1.22	1.14	1.98	1.17	3.70	1.49
SC	*2.96	*1.02	*5.49	*1.30	na	na	#*8.31	#*1.58
TN	na							
TX	#4.88	#3.26	#6.28	#4.49	#6.96	#4.59	#9.32	#4.79
VA	na	na	2.74	1.28	4.04	1.70	11.19	3.30

State	1915#		1920#		1925#	
	W	B	W	B	W	B
AL	9.41	1.78	9.83	1.52	15.91	3.22
AR	12.95	4.59				
FL	11.50	2.64				
GA	9.58	1.76				
LA	13.73	1.31				
MS	10.60	2.26				
NC	5.27	2.02	11.67	4.33	22.04	8.18
SC	10.00	1.44				
TN	8.27	4.83				
TX	10.08	5.74				
VA	9.64	2.74				

State	1930*		1935#		1941-2	
	W	B	W	B	W	B
AL	37.50	7.16	17.88	5.65	41.17	11.84
AR	26.91	17.06	13.59	5.16	34.52	12.89
FL	78.25	10.57	36.16	11.65	80.17	24.76
GA	31.52	6.98	19.77	5.04	46.14	12.57
LA	40.64	7.84	23.85	6.05	66.28	14.21
MS	31.33	5.94	22.34	4.72	44.32	8.77
NC	44.48	14.30	19.10	11.24	47.28	25.25
SC	52.89	5.20	23.77	5.19	55.91	12.81
TN	46.52	31.54	na	na	na	na
TX	46.71	39.66	28.08	14.42	67.04	34.58
VA	47.46	13.30	22.72	10.35	na	na

State	1947-8**		1951-2**	
	W	B	W	B
AL	122.98	74.97	127.72	102.25
AR	103.29	59.57	102.05	67.75
FL	177.38	112.70	195.01	153.24
GA	126.87	58.73	163.76	110.39
LA	na	na	na	na
MS	114.74	23.82	117.43	35.27
NC	113.80	96.39	152.20	128.67
SC	146.42	67.62	159.34	95.65
TN	na	na	na	na
TX	na	na	na	na
VA	na	na	na	na

Sources:

1880-1910: Computed from data in reports of state superintendents of schools in each state.
1915: Thomas Jesse Jones, *Negro Education* (NY: Arno Press, reprint ed., 1969), II, 10.

1920, 1925: Horace Mann Bond, *The Education of the Negro in the American Social Order* (NY: Octogon Books, reprint ed., 1970), 153-56.

1930: Henry Allen Bullock, *A History of Negro Education in the South* (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1967), 180.

1935-48: U.S. Office of Education, *Biennial Survey of Education in the U.S.* (Washington: GPO, serial).

1951-52: John Ansley Griffin, "Biracial Education in the South: A Study in Social Change" (unpub. Ph.D. Diss.: U. of Wisc., 1956).

Notes

*	expenditures/enrollment
**	expenditures/average daily attendance
#	includes funds for salaries only
na	not available

Table 4
Variable and Equation Definitions for Tables 5-12

Name	Definition
β	Slope coefficient
ENC	Percentage Change in Enrollment in Schools
EX	Expenditures Divided by Enrollment or Population
EXC	Change in Expenditures or Salaries Divided by Enrollment or Population
L	Length of School Term
LCH	Change in Length of School Term
B,W	Black or White Schools or Students
(dates)	Years–e.g., 0510 = Change from 1905 to 1910
t	Time period (= 1, 2...6)
u	error term

Sources: All statistics in subsequent tables are computed from data in the reports of state superintendants of education.
"t" statistics are in parentheses.
All variables are weighted by enrollment by race.

Equations A: $ENCB_{t2\_t1} = \text{intercept} + (\beta) EXB_{t1} + u$

Equations B: $EXCB_{t3\_t2} = \text{intercept} + (\beta) ENCB_{t2\_t1}$

Equations C: $EXB_{t2} = \text{intercept} + (\beta) ENCB_{t2\_t1}$

Table 5
Enrollment and Expenditure Changes in Louisiana, 1885-1910

Dependent Variable	Constant	β	Independent Variable
		Equations A	
ENCB 0510	-0.03(-0.28)	0.09(2.24)	EXB 05
ENCB 9905	-0.20(-1.65)	0.05(1.02)	EXB 99
ENCB 9599	0.05(0.59)	0.04(1.23)	EXB 95
ENCB 9095	-0.10(-0.41)	0.20(1.94)	EXB 90
ENCB 8590	-0.16(-0.91)	0.14(1.99)	EXB 85
ENCW 0510	0.27(5.30)	0.00(0.69)	EXW 05
ENCW 9905	0.19(3.40)	-0.00(-0.53)	EXW 99
ENCW 9599	0.17(2.03)	0.00(0.54)	EXW 95
ENCW 9095	0.23(1.46)	0.04(1.53)	EXW 90
ENCW 8590	0.13(1.07)	-0.00(-0.08)	EXW 85
		Equations B	
EXCB 0510	0.46(3.12)	0.46(1.42)	ENCB 9905
EXCB 9905	-0.35(-2.08)	0.26(0.62)	ENCB 9599
EXCB 9599	0.42(1.82)	0.16(0.64)	ENCB 9095
EXCB 9095	-0.60(-2.81)	0.63(2.13)	ENCB 8590
EXCW 0510	3.72(9.47)	0.15(0.13)	ENCW 9905
EXCW 9905	-0.74(-0.92)	2.61(1.50)	ENCW 9599
EXCW 9599	2.90(4.36)	-0.57(-0.68)	ENCW 9095
EXCW 9095	3.23(3.75)	-2.38(-1.35)	ENCW 8590
		Equations C	
EXB 10	2.40(9.37)	0.54(1.01)	ENCB 0510
EXB 05	2.03(9.40)	-0.49(-1.02)	ENCB 9905
EXB 99	2.50(13.79)	-0.55(-1.22)	ENCB 9599
EXB 95	2.24(10.01)	-0.40(-1.70)	ENCB 9095
EXB 90	2.55(12.35)	-0.55(-1.92)	ENCB 8590
EXW 10	13.61(18.72)	-2.28(-1.31)	ENCW 0510
EXW 05	10.02(14.04)	-2.97(-1.43)	ENCW 9905
EXW 99	9.92(7.12)	-1.65(-0.55)	ENCW 9599
EXW 95	8.50(7.68)	-1.89(-1.34)	ENCW 9095
EXW 90	6.78(14.11)	-4.02(-4.09)	ENCW 8590

Table 6
Enrollment and Expenditure Changes in Mississippi, 1890-1910

Dependent Variable	Constant	β	Independent Variable
		Equations A	
ENCB 0510	0.17(2.77)	-0.04(-1.36)	EXB 05
ENCB 9905	0.20(3.65)	-0.03(-0.78)	EXB 99
ENCB 9599	0.04(0.32)	-0.01(-0.13)	EXB 95
ENCB 9095	0.14(1.42)	-0.05(-0.65)	EXB 90
ENCW 0510	0.09(1.59)	0.00(0.03)	EXW 05
ENCW 9905	0.23(3.33)	-0.02(-1.06)	EXW 99
ENCW 9599	0.08(1.86)	-0.01(-1.04)	EXW 95
ENCW 9095	0.03(0.38)	0.01(0.44)	EXW 90
		Equations B	
EXCB 0510	-0.73(-5.77)	-0.81(-1.95)	ENCB 9905
EXCB 9905	1.15(13.81)	0.02(0.05)	ENCB 9599
EXCB 9599	-0.15(-1.18)	-0.20(-0.32)	ENCB 9095
EXCW 0510	-0.99(-2.46)	0.97(0.68)	ENCW 9905
EXCW 9905	4.01(11.88)	-0.89(-0.41)	ENCW 9599
EXCW 9599	-0.56(-3.81)	-0.17(-0.26)	ENCW 9095
		Equations C	
EXB 10	1.29(14.62)	-0.39(-0.79)	ENCB 0510
EXB 05	2.13(21.54)	0.18(0.57)	ENCB 9905
EXB 99	1.11(9.35)	0.34(0.63)	ENCB 9599
EXB 95	1.26(35.28)	0.01(0.08)	ENCB 9095
EXW 10	6.03(15.98)	-1.83(-0.84)	ENCW 0510
EXW 05	6.58(12.24)	0.36(0.19)	ENCW 9905
EXW 99	2.90(15.75)	-0.23(-0.20)	ENCW 9599
EXW 95	3.34(16.85)	0.53(0.61)	ENCW 9095

Table 7
Enrollment and Expenditure Changes in Alabama, 1885-1910

Dependent Variable	Constant	β	Independent Variable
		Equations A	
ENCB 0510	-0.19(-1.50)	0.30(4.92)	EXB 05
ENCB 9905	-0.20(-1.73)	0.07(0.92)	EXB 99
ENCB 9599	-0.06(-0.86)	0.06(1.41)	EXB 95
ENCB 9095	-0.48(-5.20)	0.25(5.27)	EXB 90
ENCB 8590	0.23(2.22)	0.01(0.32)	EXB 85
ENCW 0510	0.24(2.76)	0.01(0.52)	EXW 05
ENCW 9905	0.01(0.19)	0.04(2.25)	EXW 99
ENCW 9599	-0.01(-0.28)	0.01(0.34)	EXW 95
ENCW 9095	-0.38(-2.92)	0.26(3.72)	EXW 90
ENCW 8590	0.38(4.53)	-0.06(-1.59)	EXW 85
		Equations B	
EXCB 0510	0.35(2.07)	1.06(2.72)	ENCB 9905
EXCB 9905	0.60(4.16)	0.73(1.09)	ENCB 9599
EXCB 9599	-0.12(-2.26)	0.47(2.37)	ENCB 9095
EXCB 9095	-0.83(-6.40)	1.06(3.25)	ENCB 8590
EXCW 0510	3.49(7.92)	3.63(2.72)	ENCW 9905
EXCW 9905	1.97(6.81)	2.05(1.56)	ENCW 9599
EXCW 9599	0.20(0.81)	-0.11(-0.12)	ENCW 9095
EXCW 9095	0.36(2.22)	-0.15(-0.37)	ENCW 8590
		Equations C	
EXB 10	2.10(8.92)	0.31(0.92)	ENCB 0510
EXB 05	1.85(12.62)	-0.79(-2.36)	ENCB 9905
EXB 99	1.31(13.02)	-0.34(-0.77)	ENCB 9599
EXB 95	1.43(13.71)	-0.46(-1.19)	ENCB 9095
EXB 90	2.16(20.79)	-1.04(-3.96)	ENCB 8590
EXW 10	8.69(9.85)	-0.14(-0.07)	ENCW 0510
EXW 05	4.30(12.90)	1.18(1.16)	ENCW 9905
EXW 99	2.51(7.70)	-2.92(-1.97)	ENCW 9599
EXW 95	2.34(10.03)	-0.16(-0.18)	ENCW 9095
EXW 90	2.06(28.77)	-0.69(-3.82)	ENCW 8590

Table 8
Enrollment and Term Length Changes in Alabama, 1895-1910

Dependent Variable	Constant	β	Independent Variable
		Equations A	
ENCB 0510	0.09(0.16)	0.00(0.50)	LB 05
ENCB 9905	-0.30(-1.07)	0.00(0.70)	LB 99
ENCB 9599	0.01(0.02)	0.00(0.36)	LB 95
ENCW 0510	0.25(1.06)	0.00(0.12)	LW 05
ENCW 9905	-0.12(-0.63)	0.00(1.27)	LW 99
ENCW 9599	0.03(0.52)	-0.00(-0.58)	LW 95
		Equations B	
LCHB 0510	-1.28(-0.71)	-2.58(-0.61)	ENCB 9905
LCHB 9905	28.60(15.86)	-3.37(-0.43)	ENCB 9599
LCHB 9599	-19.61(-3.46)	1.70(0.08)	ENCB 9095
LCHW 0510	24.23(11.30)	2.14(0.34)	ENCW 9905
LCHW 9905	29.93(15.45)	16.61(1.88)	ENCW 9599
LCHW 9599	-25.13(-3.41)	-43.78(-1.57)	ENCW 9095
		Equations C	
LB 10	91.33(37.81)	9.13(2.61)	ENCB 0510
LB 05	95.66(50.10)	5.97(1.34)	ENCB 9905
LB 99	66.81(35.03)	-1.77(-0.21)	ENCB 9599
LB 95	86.04(14.80)	1.58(0.07)	ENCB 9095
LW 10	128.14(39.17)	9.98(1.25)	ENCW 0510
LW 05	104.68(40.65)	7.56(0.99)	ENCW 9905
LW 99	75.17(31.99)	-7.31(-0.68)	ENCW 9599
LW 95	100.49(13.11)	42.51(1.46)	ENCW 9095

Table 9
Enrollment and Expenditures Changes in Georgia, 1895-1910

Dependent Variable	Constant	β	Independent Variable
		Equations A	
ENCB 0510	0.14 (2.12)	-0.05(-1.46)	EXB 05
ENCB 0005	0.15(2.13)	-0.02(-0.54)	EXB 00
ENCB 9500	0.23(3.53)	-0.09(-1.96)	EXB 95
ENCW 0510	0.05(0.94)	-0.01(-0.80)	EXW 05
ENCW 0005	0.09(0.67)	0.02(0.59)	EXW 00
ENCW 9500	0.01(0.22)	0.01(1.02)	EXW 95
		Equations B	
EXCB 0510	0.13(0.92)	0.73(1.46)	ENCB 0005
EXCB 0005	0.27(3.22)	0.46(1.66)	ENCB 9500
EXCW 0510	1.60(7.98)	2.13(2.05)	ENCW 0005
EXCW 0005	3.93(5.43)	11.27(5.78)	ENCW 9500
		Equations C	
EXB 10	0.98(2.65)	7.05(7.11)	ENCB 0510
EXB 05	1.89(22.38)	-0.11(-0.35)	ENCB 0005
EXB 00	1.76(31.38)	-0.50(-2.87)	ENCB 9500
EXW 10	9.17(17.50)	-8.48(-5.49)	ENCW 0510
EXW 05	4.95(17.51)	0.07(0.09)	ENCW 0005
EXW 00	3.63(23.63)	-0.16(-0.20)	ENCW 9500

Table 10
Enrollment and Expenditure Changes in Florida, 1896-1910

Dependent Variable	Constant	β	Independent Variable
		Equations A	
ENCB 0510	-0.02(-0.37)	0.06(1.42)	EXB 05
ENCB 0005	0.12(1.09)	0.03(0.82)	EXB 00
ENCB 9600	-0.56(-14.20)	-0.04(-4.81)	EXB 96
ENCW 0510	-0.01(-0.10)	0.01(0.96)	EXW 05
ENCW 0005	0.21(1.91)	0.01(0.41)	EXW 00
ENCW 9600	0.19(1.64)	-0.01(-0.60)	EXW 96
		Equations B	
EXCB 0510	1.40(4.80)	0.54(0.70)	ENCB 0005
EXCB 0005	0.42(0.62)	2.03(2.23)	ENCB 9600
EXCW 0510	5.53(4.11)	-0.48(-0.15)	ENCW 0005
EXCW 0005	0.54(1.20)	-2.72(-1.56)	ENCW 9600
		Equations C	
EXB 10	2.95(8.68)	0.98(0.54)	ENCB 0510
EXB 05	1.39(9.75)	0.22(0.59)	ENCB 0005
EXB 00	-0.87(-0.98)	-5.01(-4.18)	ENCB 9600
EXW 10	12.17(9.69)	1.50(0.27)	ENCW 0510
EXW 05	6.88(13.35)	0.16(0.12)	ENCW 0005
EXW 00	6.40(10.67)	2.53(1.10)	ENCW 9600

Table 11
Enrollment and Expenditure Changes in North Carolina, 1880-1910

Dependent Variable	Constant	β	Independent Variable
		Equations A	
ENCB 0510	-0.24(-1.75)	0.16(1.51)	EXB 05
ENCB 0005	0.23(3.60)	0.02(0.12)	EXB 00
ENCB 9500	-0.08(-0.77)	0.13(1.26)	EXB 95
ENCB 9095	0.18(1.61)	-0.06(-0.54)	EXB 90
ENCB 8590	0.04(0.73)	-0.03(-0.73)	EXB 85
ENCB 8085	0.12(0.70)	-0.04(-0.20)	EXB 80
ENCW 0510	0.03(0.71)	0.03(1.58)	EXW 05
ENCW 0005	0.10(1.91)	0.02(0.61)	EXW 00
ENCW 9500	0.05(-0.50)	0.17(2.35)	EXW 95
ENCW 9095	0.36(2.87)	-0.15(-1.34)	EXW 90
ENCW 8590	0.25(3.41)	-0.12(-1.95)	EXW 85
ENCW 8085	-0.15(-1.06)	0.23(1.30)	EXW 80
		Equations B	
EXCB 0510	0.32(4.40)	-0.32(-1.65)	ENCB 0005
EXCB 0005	0.14(3.35)	0.09(0.54)	ENCB 9500
EXCB 9500	0.00(0.06)	0.04(0.37)	ENCB 9095
EXCB 9095	0.08(2.26)	0.04(0.34)	ENCB 8590
EXCB 8590	-0.27(-2.32)	-0.54(-1.86)	ENCB 8085
EXCW 0510	0.98(8.82)	0.40(0.76)	ENCW 0005
EXCW 0005	0.72(9.61)	0.10(0.41)	ENCW 9500
EXCW 9500	0.24(5.42)	-0.04(-0.33)	ENCW 9095
EXCW 9095	0.13(2.84)	-0.13(-0.70)	ENCW 8590
EXCW 8590	0.02(0.39)	-0.26(-1.66)	ENCW 8085
		Equations C	
EXB 10	1.39(29.62)	0.06(0.41)	ENCB 0510
EXB 05	1.21(31.79)	0.16(1.08)	ENCB 0005
EXB 00	1.06(34.79)	0.04(0.36)	ENCB 9500
EXB 95	1.10(27.31)	-0.23(-1.78)	ENCB 9095
EXB 90	0.91(27.42)	-0.02(-0.18)	ENCB 8590
EXB 85	1.28(11.26)	0.41(1.43)	ENCB 8085
EXW 10	3.15(18.96)	0.95(0.95)	ENCW 0510
EXW 05	2.13(20.64)	0.58(1.18)	ENCW 0005
EXW 00	1.37(24.27)	0.36(1.96)	ENCW 9500
EXW 95	1.26(21.46)	-0.19(-1.21)	ENCW 9095
EXW 90	1.08(16.47)	0.35(1.26)	ENCW 8590
EXW 85	1.10(24.96)	0.33(2.64)	ENCW 8085

Table 12
Enrollment and Expenditure Changes in Virginia, 1890-1910

Dependent Variable	Constant	β	Independent Variable
		Equations A	
ENCB 0510	0.10(3.04)	-0.05(-2.82)	EXB 05
ENCB 0105	-0.05(-1.44)	-0.01(-0.39)	EXB 01
ENCB 9001	-0.25(-6.94)	-0.01(-0.50)	EXB 90
ENCW 0510	-0.03(-1.44)	0.03(5.75)	EXW 05
ENCW 0105	-0.07(-1.69)	0.03(2.08)	EXW 01
ENCW 9001	0.12(1.65)	-0.06(-2.30)	EXW 90
		Equations B	
EXCB 0510	3.09(12.58)	1.92(1.21)	ENCB 0105
EXCB 0105	0.41(3.96)	0.04(0.12)	ENCB 9001
EXCW 0510	8.39(19.01)	10.95(3.44)	ENCW 0105
EXCW 0105	1.03(13.20)	0.99(3.13)	ENCW 9001
		Equations C	
EXB 10	3.35(19.23)	-0.09(-0.07)	ENCB 0510
EXB 05	1.74(21.32)	0.07(0.14)	ENCB 0105
EXB 01	1.32(10.00)	0.06(0.14)	ENCB 9001
EXW 10	7.98(14.86)	34.44(7.91)	ENCW 0510
EXW 05	3.86(28.35)	3.47(3.54)	ENCW 0105
EXW 01	2.66(28.44)	0.05(0.12)	ENCW 9001