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A General Characterization of Optimal Income Taxation and Enforcement

Chander, Parkash and Wilde, Louis L. (1994) A General Characterization of Optimal Income Taxation and Enforcement. Social Science Working Paper, 791. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-154428133

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Abstract

This paper develops a general approach to characterizing optimal income tax enforcement. Our analysis clarifies the nature of the interplay between tax rates, audit probabilities, and penalties for misreporting. In particular, it is shown that for a variety of objective functions for the principal the optimal tax schedule is in general concave (at least weakly) and monotonic; the marginal tax rates determine the audit probabilities; and less harsh penalties lead to higher enforcement costs. Our results imply that there exists a tradeoff between equity and efficiency considerations in the enforcement context which is similar to that in the moral hazard context for tax policy.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:Revised version. Original dated to March 1992. This is a revised version of Chander and Wilde (1992). We thank Kim Border, Luis Corchon, Rajeeva Karandikar, John Ledyard, Dilip Mookherjee, Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin, Thomas Palfrey, Till Requate and Kunal Sengupta for helpful comments and discussion. We have also benefitted from a seminar presentation at Caltech.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Principal, agent, informational asymmetry, costly verification, income taxes, audit probabilities, penalty for misreporting, revelation principle, efficient schemes, regressive taxes, equity-efficiency tradeoffs
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:791
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-154428133
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-154428133
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80931
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:30 Aug 2017 17:06
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:36

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