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Delegation and the Regulation of Risk

Lohmann, Susanne and Hopenhayn, Hugo (1998) Delegation and the Regulation of Risk. Games and Economic Behavior, 23 (2). pp. 222-246. ISSN 0899-8256. doi:10.1006/game.1997.0623.

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Political principals typically use low-cost “fire-alarm” signals transmitted by the media, interest groups, and disaffected constituents to monitor the activities of regulatory agencies. We argue that regulatory decision making is biased and inconsistent if the instruments of political oversight are simple and the information flows to the principal are coarse relative to the complexity of the regulatory environment.

Item Type:Article
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Additional Information:© 1998 Academic Press. Received 14 November 1995.
Issue or Number:2
Classification Code:JEL: D72, L51
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-160244581
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Official Citation:Susanne Lohmann, Hugo Hopenhayn, Delegation and the Regulation of Risk, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 23, Issue 2, May 1998, Pages 222-246, ISSN 0899-8256, (
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80935
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:30 Aug 2017 17:05
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:39

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