Delegation and the Regulation of Risk

Lohmann, Susanne and Hopenhayn, Hugo (1998) Delegation and the Regulation of Risk. Games and Economic Behavior, 23 (2). pp. 222-246. ISSN 0899-8256. doi:10.1006/game.1997.0623. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-160244581

PDF - Published Version
See Usage Policy.
172kB

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-160244581

Abstract

Political principals typically use low-cost “fire-alarm” signals transmitted by the media, interest groups, and disaffected constituents to monitor the activities of regulatory agencies. We argue that regulatory decision making is biased and inconsistent if the instruments of political oversight are simple and the information flows to the principal are coarse relative to the complexity of the regulatory environment.

Item Type:

Article

Related URLs:

URL	URL Type	Description
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0623	DOI	Article
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825697906230	Publisher	Article
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170815-142256366	Related Item	Working Paper

Additional Information:

Issue or Number:

Classification Code:

JEL: D72, L51

DOI:

10.1006/game.1997.0623

Record Number:

CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-160244581

Persistent URL:

https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-160244581

Official Citation:

Susanne Lohmann, Hugo Hopenhayn, Delegation and the Regulation of Risk, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 23, Issue 2, May 1998, Pages 222-246, ISSN 0899-8256, https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0623. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825697906230)

Usage Policy:

No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.

ID Code:

80935

Collection:

CaltechAUTHORS

Deposited By:

Tony Diaz

Deposited On:

30 Aug 2017 17:05

Last Modified:

15 Nov 2021 19:39

Repository Staff Only: item control page