Keech, William R. (1992) Rules, Discretion, and Accountability in Macroeconomic Policymaking. Social Science Working Paper, 789. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-161329587
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Abstract
Arguments for rules rather than discretion in macroeconomic policymaking facilitate the understanding of some fundamental issues of democratic theory. This article reviews four such arguments, and relates them to issues of delegation and accountability in representative government.
| Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | I would like to thank Henry Chappell, Kenneth Coleman, Thomas Hammond, Roderick Kiewiet, Laura Langbein, Michael Munger, Joseph Rees, Donald Searing, and Stephen Weatherford for their comments on a previous version. Published as Keech, William R. "Rules, discretion, and accountability in macroeconomic policymaking." Governance 5, no. 3 (1992): 259-278. | ||||||
| Group: | Social Science Working Papers | ||||||
| Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper | ||||||
| Issue or Number: | 789 | ||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-161329587 | ||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-161329587 | ||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
| ID Code: | 80938 | ||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||
| Deposited On: | 30 Aug 2017 16:59 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:36 |
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